External surveillance

[Hacker]

Outdoor surveillance can be mobile or stationary and can be carried out for quite a long time, sometimes using hidden video and photo equipment. The most important task in conducting surveillance is to avoid identifying the detective, so he should not attract the attention of people around him.

Professional detectives are people in their twenties and fifties. They have typical, unmemorable faces with no special signs. Their figures are also ordinary, not tall or short, not fat or thin. They dress low-key, but modern and tasteful, and they can replace the upper part of the wardrobe (shirts, blouses, jackets, raincoats, jackets) during surveillance. They can also disguise themselves by pasting mustaches, beards, etc. They use all these attributes after they get into the eyes of the subject of observation, so that he does not remember them when he sees them a second time.

For surveillance, they use the most common cars for these streets, and without any obvious excesses - not quite clean, not quite new, not too big, but also not too small, without putty stains, car decorations (stickers, emblems, toys), non-standard trim elements and large, eye-catching antennas. Most often - this is a standard Lada. You can also use vans, less often motorcycles. Experts will never use vehicles that are red, orange, yellow, white, or other bright or fashionable colors for surveillance.

Detect hidden surveillance should be carefully, so as not to alert criminals. If the fact of opening the surveillance object is detected, criminals will immediately stop it, connect additional forces and apply more sophisticated methods of outdoor surveillance. Therefore, it is recommended that both the tracking object and its security guards behave smoothly and calmly, and that they refrain from rough checks, especially from demonstrating any skills in this area.

Stationary surveillance:
The simplest type of surveillance is stationary. It is conducted from a stationary post, which is located in a place where its long stay is understandable, and at the same time it is possible to control all approaches to the object. These can be rented apartments, parked cars, shops, entrances, technical rooms of buildings, kiosks or mobile stands, cafes and restaurants, offices of companies, public transport stops, areas of imitation of "repair" work, parks, etc.

To increase the secrecy of actions, criminals can use technical means of visual surveillance (telesystems, binoculars, etc.), which allows you to increase the distance to the object of observation and makes it difficult to detect them. As a rule, small-scale criminal groups do not have the forces for qualified surveillance from permanent posts for several days.

Stationary surveillance is carried out for the purpose of monitoring a certain area, buildings, or objects or persons that are not in motion. Criminals are most interested in places where the protected person drives up by car - places of residence, work, regular visits (gyms, saunas, restaurants, mistresses apartments, etc.). When studying these objects, vulnerabilities are identified on the approaches and inside, as well as ways of approach and departure.

Sometimes stationary surveillance is also used on the route, when the movement of the object is known and its appearance in the place of observation is predetermined. At the same time, as a rule, they choose such places where, due to objective reasons, the car with the object of observation is forced to slow down or stop. Stationary surveillance is very difficult to detect. This should be done by specially designated security guards or bodyguards when they are not engaged in direct support of the client.

Identification of stationary surveillance is carried out by regular thorough examination of the environment in places where such surveillance is possible. If unusual, atypical changes in the environment are detected, they are thoroughly investigated.

The following points should alert you:

• An unfamiliar car parked with people, especially standing together for a long time, from where you can see the entrance and the car of the potential victim. If amateurs work, then there are several people in the car, and in the cabin there may be a change of clothes, food and thermos flasks. Professionals will never allow themselves to do this, and in this case there will be only one person in the car. If the surveillance is carried out for several days, then the car, its parking place, as well as the persons in it are periodically changed.
• Strangers who have been in the control zone for a long time. Unlike mobile surveillance, stationary surveillance does not have any special requirements for the appearance of observers, and the circle of people involved can be much wider. This can be a long time sitting at the window or at a table on the street cafe visitor; a person who seems to be reading a newspaper, but does not pay attention to it; a woman who is supposedly talking on a pay phone, but at the same time watching the entrance of the house opposite; a person who entered the store, who does not buy anything, but;
• An inconspicuous car that has driven away, or people who have started talking on their mobile phone, come out of the entrance, or show fussiness after the subject of surveillance has left their place of residence.
• Detection of attics, windows of abandoned buildings and other premises being inspected by unauthorized persons near places visited by a potential victim in order to select a place for a sniper or conduct surveillance.
• Permanently curtained windows of neighboring buildings - covert surveillance can be conducted from a rented apartment.
• The appearance "on business" in the adjacent territory of people in the form of fire protection officers or representatives of various city repair services, who did not inspire confidence in their appearance, behavior or lack of identity cards.

At the place of residence, it is useful to maintain good relations with neighbors, pensioners living in the house who like to sit on a bench at the entrance, janitors who clean the surrounding territory. Sometimes they can report outsiders clumsily conducting surveillance.

Mobile surveillance:
Mobile surveillance (surveillance) of the protected person is carried out when it is moving in a car, on public transport, on foot.

3-8 people, including at least one woman, are used to conduct competent car surveillance in several cars (no more than two people in one car). Amateurs can limit themselves to one car, while it can accommodate 3-4 people. In order not to get into the eyes of the object of observation, use various methods of disguise. If one car is being followed, it follows the object of surveillance, keeping slightly to the left or right of the lane of its movement and allowing no more than two extraneous cars to pass in front of it.

When using two cars, one of them, if possible, uses parallel streets and captures the observed person through intersections. They change places from time to time. If there is a third car, it is either ahead of the object, watching it in the rearview mirror, or waiting for it somewhere along the route to take over the" baton " from colleagues. In deserted areas, it is easy to spot the watchers, so they usually overtake the object, turn into an alley, and wait for a while.

Another scheme may also apply. One of the surveillance vehicles is moving ahead of the object, another one is moving at some distance from it (but at a visual control distance), and another car is closing the chain. When an object stops or after a certain time, the car chasing it passes by, transmitting surveillance (via radio) to the car following it. When the object of observation sharply increases its speed, the observer's functions are transmitted to the car in front.

High-level surveillance often uses means of secretly determining the location of the car - special radio beacons (beepers). They are mounted anywhere on the subject's car, usually on the rear bumper, and allow pursuers to move at a considerable distance, making it difficult to detect them. This should be kept in mind when inspecting the car of a potential victim. A listening device can also be installed in the car.

To detect surveillance on the way, it is necessary to record cars whose passengers are trying to visually identify themselves during overtaking. In traffic, you should also search for suspicious vehicles, which include cars that unreasonably change lanes or directions, unnecessarily violate the rules, or protrude from behind intermediate covering vehicles.

The main criteria for whether a car belongs to surveillance are its repeatability in several places and the actions characteristic of tracking the object of surveillance. When such vehicles appear, they remember their make, license plate, color, appearance, and description of the driver (passengers). It should be borne in mind that somewhere around the corner, the driver can simply leave the car, letting his partner behind the wheel. Therefore, it is more important to remember cars than drivers.

If necessary, suspicions are checked (on the routes studied) by unexpectedly turning into a sparsely populated alley, changing the direction, row and speed of traffic, while monitoring how the surrounding cars react. You can use a plausible excuse to stop around the corner and fix the car that passes by. They also use U-turns in the opposite direction in permitted and designated areas, squares with circular traffic, interchanges on the outskirts of the city and the third ring, driving through well-studied through courtyards, and so on.

It makes sense to "check out" and at the entrance to the place of work. For example, drive a couple of extra blocks and suddenly park in front of a cafe. If a car with observers is following you, it will most likely pass by. If a car that has already been seen several times is identified among those who have passed by, this may lead to the idea of surveillance. A surveillance professional will probably not fall for this trick, but under unfavorable circumstances (there is no parking space, side streets, heavy traffic), it can also be lit up.

Four to six people are usually used to provide qualified support to the object of observation when moving on foot. Surveillance is carried out in such a way that only one observer is always present in the immediate vicinity of the object, so that none of the team members will show up twice on the route. Skilled stalkers often transfer the object of surveillance first to another fil to the second, then to the third, and so on. In a standard situation, the optimal location of the filer is considered to be the position behind the object's back.

The most common methods of surveillance are:
* "Chain": one agent directly observes the object, the rest are placed behind the extended chain, focusing on the previous one. If the object detects the primary agent, it immediately gives way to the next agent. The "double chain" is designed for crowded streets: observers walk on both sides of the street, occasionally moving from one side to the other.
* "Ahead of time": agents periodically overtake the object of observation, which is constantly between them.
* "Connected": the reception involves attracting new people to follow along pre-planned sections of the route.
* "Network" - reception is effective when an object is lost: the entire nearest area is covered by a shrinking ring, and after finding the target, the ring turns back into a standard chain.
* "Lead" - one of the observers moves ahead of the object, guided by pre-given instructions, or receiving messages about the movement of the object on the radio. The point of this method is that the place that is convenient for detaching the object from observation should be occupied in advance. For example, an item crosses a railway before a suitable train. This train blocks the path of pursuers who are slightly behind. But a little earlier, this road was already crossed by the "leader".

* "Parallel maintenance". The map item moves along an area with a linear-transverse (or radial-circular) layout. For example, in blocks of prefabricated houses arranged in neat rows. In this case, one observer follows the object directly, and the rest of them move along side roads that run parallel to it. If an object" checks out " and suddenly turns into a cross passage, it will see that the person following it did not turn off, but went further. Like "no tail". But in fact, the object was taken by a police officer walking along one of the side roads.

During the work, the observer must maintain an unperturbed expression and ostentatious indifference. If an encounter with an object is unavoidable, then he will avoid even immediate eye-to-eye contact with the object. For example, they may turn away abruptly or go in the opposite direction (swerve).

When an object is visited by an organization or institution, the security guard accompanies it around the building only if there is no possibility of visual contact through the windows and doors. If the object uses an elevator, then the tracker will not go up in the same elevator with the object, as it is more likely to remember its appearance. Once the sign indicates the floor of the elevator's ascent, it will go up to the floor above or below to search for the object and then control it. In order to avoid the possibility of leaving the object from observation, the remaining members of the team will carry out visual control of all exits from the building.

When an object visits a restaurant or cafe, it is monitored by one agent or a "married" couple. They order several dishes to justify their location and continue to observe the object. They usually pay the bill in advance. After the exit, the object is most often transferred to other members of the team, and the" lit up " detectives are removed from further observation in order to exclude the possibility of their decryption.

In public transport (bus, trolleybus, or tram), surveillance is carried out by one agent who monitors the actions of the object and informs the vehicle moving at a distance with the rest of the team via mobile communication. If for some reason the agent did not manage to enter after the object of surveillance, then he chases the vehicle by car, and at the intermediate stop he can make an attempt to get into the vehicle to the object. The metro usually uses two people, one of whom follows in one car with the object, the other-in the next car.

When detecting surveillance while traveling on foot, attention should be focused on repeated meetings with the same persons at different points along the route. The second sign that can be used to determine surveillance is the inappropriate behavior of the stalker, which is explained by the contradiction between his desire not to lose sight of the object of observation and the need to conduct surveillance covertly, without getting into the field of view of the object and security.

There are many techniques for detecting surveillance. It is not difficult to see people behind you in a mirrored display case, so you can move along the display cases, looking at the contents of the counters (professional filers in this case, to avoid detection, go close to the display cases). Enter shops that can be reached by climbing the steps in the opposite direction to your original movement. The stores themselves also offer many excellent opportunities for detecting surveillance.

You can also look around to see those who are following you, but only so as not to alert the pursuer. People cast a justified backward glance when entering a place and holding the door of a store, metro station, or entrance. You can also pretend that your mobile phone rang. When you "talk", you will slow down or stop altogether and turn thoughtfully in the direction opposite to your movement. You can drop something, "suddenly notice it" and, turning around, look for what is supposedly dropped. You can also turn around abruptly and go to the nearest newspaper or cigarette stand.

You can check for surveillance by crossing to the opposite side of the street. When approaching the roadway, it is quite natural to turn your head in the direction from which traffic can go to make sure that the crossing is safe. Within three to five seconds, you can safely view the street, as well as capture the people who fall into your field of vision. This technique gives particularly high results in places with a small number of passers-by.

Public transport also provides many opportunities for detecting surveillance. It is recommended to enter ground transport (tram, bus, trolleybus) from the rear platform, it is also better to be there during the entire further trip, so that you can not only visually control the entire cabin and passengers, but also be able to control cars moving behind your vehicle. In public transport, it is quite reasonable (with nothing to do) to consider passengers, and this is what you need to use.

When detecting surveillance, it is important not to overdo it. In any case, your intentions should not be guessed by possible observers. You should never, for example, pretend that you are tying a loose shoelace for some reason, and at the same time turn your head, looking at the faces of passers-by. Do not turn around abruptly, jump out of the car when the doors close, and so on. On the contrary, stay calm, even, deep in yourself and seemingly oblivious to what is happening around you. This will lull the pursuers vigilance.

Counter-surveillance:
For effective and covert detection of surveillance, it is recommended to use counter-surveillance, that is, observation of observers from the side (from temporary points located on sections of the route of the object of observation). The fact is that the observation team is likely to look quite natural in the eyes of the object of observation and its guards. But from the point of view of outside observers, the actions of such a team may look extremely inadequate.

Counter-surveillance begins with the subject, his bodyguards, and the counter-surveillance team working together to develop a verification plan, naturally in strict confidentiality. A route is created that contains places that are "inconvenient" for observers.

A number of requirements must be met:

• All maneuvers must be motivated and explained in terms of business interests, spiritual needs, and the natural obvious needs of the protected person. The route should not alert the enemy by its unusual nature: the enemy should not suspect that you are trying to detect surveillance.
• There should be two or three places on the route that can be used to detect the presence of surveillance with a high probability.
• The route of the object is chosen in such a way that the counter-surveillance team has time to move from point to point and settle down in a new place, without arousing suspicion from others and the police. Since the counter-surveillance team does not know (and cannot know) who and in what quantity it will find, the same people must be present at any point of verification as at all previous ones in order to confidently identify "acquaintances" from previous points.
• The route should be quite long and complex, since it is almost impossible to detect surveillance on a short section. Experts recommend spending 1-2 hours detecting surveillance.

Counter-surveillance is conducted from pre-defined points (this is the main difference in the work of the counter-surveillance team from the observation team that follows the object). Standard counter-surveillance points are:
- passageways between two streets, short and narrow alleys, streets and sidewalks with a small number of pedestrians and vehicles;
- passageways that contain institutions, cafes, hairdressers, pharmacies, and shops for confirming your passage;
- shops or buildings with glass walls that clearly show the street from the outside;
- car parking lots;
- transfers from one mode of transport to another;
- metro stations;
- stairs and escalators leading to the direction the object just came from;
- tourist attractions that allow the item to rotate and take pictures, etc.

All counter-surveillance posts should be appropriately covered and protected. The best shelter for them is the entrances of nearby houses, shops, cafes, cars. Observers must take up their positions 30 to 40 minutes before the counter-observation object passes the designated control point of the route and leave them some time after it passes.

The most appropriate tactic is when the security guard first disperses the pursuit group, dispersing its forces, creating the appearance of losing the surveillance object, provoking it to search actions that are not typical for ordinary passers-by. For example, a surveillance object enters a courtyard that has several street exits and has a cafe, pharmacy, shop, or barber shop inside. The person following the item (always only one) may lose sight of it for a few seconds, and the item takes advantage of this to drop by one of the establishments listed above.

This is quite enough to detect the pursuit from the outside. It is important that the object of observation does not take any verification actions that are not agreed in advance with the counter-observers. Everything is done only as agreed earlier.

Other options are also possible. You can make a legendary U-turn in the specified places. You can jump to a suitable bus and then "disappointed" move away - the" wrong " route. Observers, especially untrained ones, will also jump, and since they will inevitably be further away from the stop than the object, they will have to run faster, which will not remain unnoticed.

In the course of counter-surveillance, all inconsistencies in the appearance and behavior of people and vehicles located in the visual control zone of the post, as well as signs of ongoing surveillance from nearby buildings and structures, should be recorded. Below is a list of examples that should give rise to suspicion that a security object is being spied on:

Cars in the parking lot with passengers inside.

* Vehicles that stop or move when the security object performs such actions, especially those following behind, or vehicles that pass the object, turn around and then park.
* Any machine with a different antenna than the normal one.
* Cars that turn on the turn signal and then don't turn off.
* After the car of the protected object swerves - any car that swerves behind it.
* Cars that go too fast or too slow.
* Any car that follows the object in the wrong direction on a one-way street.
* Any car that turns off a block before the stop of the facility or through a block after the bus stop.
* Cars that signal each other with flashing lights.
* Any car that keeps its distance to the object at different speeds.
* Cars traveling along parallel streets at more or less the same speed when there is little or no traffic.
* Cars that slow down and hide behind other cars when the object slows down.
* Any vehicle seen two or more times in different phases of protection from surveillance.
* Any vehicle that follows the object or enters the street shortly after the object turns around and goes in the opposite direction.
* Any person who talks on the radio.
* Any vehicle that follows the item through an entire roundabout or city block.
* Any vehicle that lingers at the roundabout until it turns off.
* Any vehicle that stops at a traffic light slightly behind and away from the object.
* Driving through a red light or taking off without waiting for a green light
* When walking the protected person's route, counter-observers are suspicious of them.:
* Anyone who turns away or turns their back when someone is looking at them.
* Anyone who hesitates and / or looks around before entering the building where the security object has just entered.
* Anyone who crosses the street when the object turns back in the direction it came from
* Those whose clothing does not fit the circumstances.
* Anyone who runs.
* Someone who grooms or enters a store, restaurant, etc. immediately before or after the facility.
* Those who are clearly trying to get a table or seat behind the object in the restaurant.
* Anyone who starts moving or stops at the same time as the object.
* Everyone who gets out of their car at the same time as the object.
* People who have been observed negotiating using portable radio communication devices.

In the beginning, it is enough for the counter-observer to note only one detail that will be necessary to confirm what he has seen in the future, for example, a fat, skinny, tall or lame person, or his movements. It is recommended to make a note and remember the clothes, shoes, or other characteristic feature of the identified surveillance participant. If it is possible to view the surveillance leader from a close distance, it is recommended to note easily noticeable signs: the shape of the nose, bald head, hair color, gender and age.

Thus, using counter-surveillance, it is possible to detect the fact of surveillance, and by the behavior of observers, you can get an indirect idea of their training and equipment (which, in turn, can be used to judge the customer of surveillance).