The Right to Be Forgotten for Carding Victims: Can the Digital Trace of Fraud Be Erased? (On Reputational Damage and How to Repair It)

[Professor]

Introduction: Post-traumatic Digital Syndrome
When a victim of carding goes through a series of card blockings, bank and police reports, it seems the worst is behind them. However, a new, less visible, but no less painful stage often begins: living with the digital trace of the fraud. This trace lives on in bank databases, credit bureaus, carder forums, and even in social media memories. It becomes a digital stigma, affecting a person's credit rating, trust in financial institutions, and psychological well-being. The question arises: does a victim have the right to digital oblivion?

Chapter 1: The Anatomy of a Digital Footprint: Where and How Victim Data Lives​

The trace is formed on several levels, each of which has its own inertia and vulnerability.

1. Internal databases of banks and processing centers:
   • What is stored: The fact of the fraudulent transaction, card number, amount, IP address (if it was an online transaction), the result of the internal investigation, the “risky client” label.
   • Storage period: From 3 to 10 years or more, depending on the bank’s policy and regulator requirements.
   • Consequences for the victim: Increased risk scoring for future transactions, automatic blocking of "suspicious" transactions, denial of premium products, more thorough checks.
2. National Credit Bureaus (NCB/BKI):
   • What is stored: Information about overdue payments due to fraud (if there was temporarily no money for mandatory payments), as well as requests from banks about credit history at the time of the incident.
   • Problem: Credit bureaus record facts, but not their context. A delinquency record remains, even if it was caused by theft of funds.
   • Consequences: Decline in credit rating for years, loan denials, higher interest rates.
3. Law enforcement databases:
   • What is stored: The victim's statement, investigation materials, card data, and possibly the assigned criminal case number. The victim is listed as the "victim", but in anonymous reports they may simply be listed as the "cardholder".
   • Risk: In the event of repeated incidents or overlapping investigations, the victim may automatically come to the attention of a "related person."
4. Shadow spaces (darknet forums, carder databases):
   • What's stored: The most dangerous data: full details (name, passport, address, card number, CVV). This data can be resold or used for targeted phishing or blackmail in a few years.
   • Peculiarity: This trace is virtually ineradicable. Data is copied, resold, and migrated through closed chats. Its leakage is a permanent threat.

Chapter 2: The Right to Be Forgotten: Does It Exist and How to Claim It?​

In a strict legal sense, the "right to be forgotten" (the right to request the removal of outdated or irrelevant information about oneself from search engines) does not directly cover fraudulent activity in internal banking systems. However, victims have a set of rights that can be used to "cleanse" the trail.

1. Within the banking system:

• Request for data correction/annotation.After the investigation is complete and funds have been restored, you can submit an official written request to the bank:
  • Add a note to your credit profile indicating that a specific transaction or incident has been determined to be fraudulent and that you are the aggrieved party.
  • Adjust the internal scoring score by removing the risk associated with this incident from the assessment algorithms.
• Reason: The Law on Personal Data guarantees the right to keep one's data up-to-date and accurate. An inaccurate or misleading "risky client" label after confirmed fraud may be considered inaccurate.

2. Within the framework of the Credit History Bureau (CHB):

• Adding a note to your credit history. You have the right to submit a request to the Credit Bureau to add a note (explanation) to your credit history. It can include the following: "The specified late payment/request from the bank [date] is related to fraudulent actions by third parties, for which there is a police report No....." This will not delete the entry, but it will be mandatory for review by any bank requesting your history.

3. In the law enforcement system:

• Request for a status certificate. After a criminal case is closed (or the investigation is terminated), you can request a certificate confirming that you were a victim of a specific fraud. This document can be attached to applications to banks and credit bureaus as official confirmation.

The main problem: All these actions require an active, persistent, and legally savvy victim. Systems aren't automatically cleared. The process is like fighting a bureaucratic Lernaean Hydra: you chop off one head (correct the bank's data), and the other one is already stuck in the credit bureau.

Chapter 3: The Indelible Trace: Darknet Data and the Psychological Burden​

1. The shadow trail is the most difficult problem.
Data on the darknet has a life of its own. The only strategy here is proactive protection :

• Regular monitoring of leaks through services like HaveIBeenPwned or domestic equivalents.
• Replacement of documents is a last resort if the leak includes passport scans. This is a drastic measure, but sometimes necessary.
• Heightened Vigilance Forever: Knowing your data is "in the wild" requires constant vigilance against phishing and social engineering.

2. Psychological trace: "Victim stigma."
The digital trace has a psychological extension:

• Alarm for every SMS from the bank.
• Awkwardness when explaining reasons for loan denial.
• Feeling vulnerable and tainted.

Working with this trace is already a psychological rehabilitation process, sometimes requiring the help of a specialist and the support of loved ones. It's important to realize that being a victim of a crime isn't shameful, but a tragedy that can happen to anyone.

Chapter 4: What Needs to Change? Proposals for Systemic Solutions​

The current system shifts the burden of "forgetting" onto the victim. Changes are needed at the regulatory level:

1. Creating a "rehabilitation protocol" for victims. The Bank of Russia could establish a standard: upon confirmation of fraud (bank decision/police report), the bank is requiredto automatically:
   • Adjust the client's internal scoring.
   • Send a notification to the Credit Bureau to add a mandatory note to your history.
   • Remove or isolate card data from hot databases to prevent false positives.
2. Developing the institution of "digital trustees" or lawyers. The state or insurance companies could provide victims of cybercrime with brief legal support to help them navigate trace cleanup procedures.
3. Educational campaigns. Informing citizens not only about how to avoid becoming a victim, but also about what steps to take afterward to minimize long-term consequences.

Conclusion: Between Law and Reality.
The right to digital oblivion for a carding victim today is not a legally guaranteed privilege, but a difficult, unequal struggle against the inertia of systems. Victims are forced to prove their "innocence" again and again, confronting algorithms designed to find risks rather than to restore justice.

A full-fledged right to oblivion in this context is not so much about data deletion (which is often technically impossible) as it is about the right to context. The right for every subsequent algorithm analyzing your financial life to see not just a dry record of the incident, but a note: "This person suffered a crime. Their data was compromised. Requires enhanced protection, but not suspicion".

Until this happens, the digital trace of fraud will resemble a scar: it can be made less visible with great effort, but it will never disappear completely. And this is one of the most bitter and long-lasting prices that a victim of carding pays, even after the stolen money is returned.