How wiretapping of Russians is organized

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"Not on the phone." "I'll call you back from another number." "Let's go outside, take a walk, it's better not to talk here."
Such phrases are firmly embedded in the life of the Russian establishment, and even a few years ago, those who complain about wiretapping phones and offices were mistaken for half-mad, like those who wear foil caps and believe in the KGB's zombie rays. Today, everyone knows that they listen to everyone, listen without regard to the law, and the materials of these wiretaps are more often used not in court, but in political intrigues, denunciations, and provocations.

In the language of law enforcement agencies, wiretapping phones and monitoring Internet traffic are called by the abbreviation "SORM" - "A system of technical means for providing the functions of operational search activities". SORM-1 is a set of measures aimed at wiretapping mobile communications, SORM-2 – mobile Internet traffic. Today, such methods of investigation come to the fore, overshadowing traditional forensic approaches. Accordingly, the units responsible for SORM They are becoming increasingly influential in the internal affairs bodies. In the Sverdlovsk Region, these are, for example, the Bureau of Special Technical Measures (BSTM) of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sverdlovsk Region and the Operational and Technical Department (OTO) of the Federal Security Service for the Sverdlovsk Region.

According to the law, wiretapping of phones and monitoring of Internet traffic is possible only by a court decision. However, the law allows investigators to "turn on the recording" even without it, if the case is urgent and wiretapping is necessary to prevent an impending crime. Approximately by the same principle, investigators are allowed to conduct searches" as an exception", receiving a court order after the fact. As in the case of searches, law enforcement officers often use this rule to gain uncontrolled access to other people's secrets. There are also ways to legalize illegal wiretapping. By putting the right person's name and phone number on a long list of suspects in a criminal case. According to sources in law enforcement agencies, judges almost never delve into how a particular surname is connected with a criminal case, and sign permits "in one fell swoop". Such court decisions are classified as "secret", and citizens will never know who was on the list of "wiretaps".

However, experts involved in wiretapping say: today, more and more often citizens are "put on the record" and without any court decisions at all. Each telecom operator has equipment installed that allows security forces to access the conversations of any client at any time (this is required by law for operators). And in the regional department of the FSB there is a remote access terminal, with which you can start listening to any mobile user in a few clicks. According to the law, several special services have the right to conduct wiretapping. In addition to the FSB itself, these are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control Service, the GUFSIN, customs, the FSO, and the SVR. But control over the hardware itself that provides operationSORM-1 andSORM-2is located exactly at the FSB. As experts explain, in order to put a particular number on wiretap, employees from the police bureau of special technical measures do not have to run to the FSB and ask to press a button: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other bodies conducting operational search activities have their own access terminals. But they are connected "through the FSB", that is, the main key is still located at the security officers.

"Why do you need so many phones?"

How to protect yourself from wiretapping?
Almost nothing. First of all, it is useless to change SIM cards: they do not put a mobile number on the wiretap, but a unique phone number (IMEI). Whatever SIM card is installed in the phone, it will still be "live". Many representatives of the establishment and businessmen carry several phones with them, believing that one "ordinary" listens, and others – "left" - do not. This is naive If a person is put on wiretap, law enforcement officers constantly receive information about the location of his phone.

However, there is a small trick with two handsets, which allows you to relatively reliably keep the secret of negotiations. "Let's say there are two devices – A and B. A is used all the time, and there is reason to believe that it is being listened to. B – for confidential conversations, registered to another person. In this case, A and B should never be included simultaneously and side by side. If you need to make a call on the "secret" phone B, you turn off A, drive away, into the range of another base station, then turn on B, make a call. Then you turn off B, go back to another base station, and then turn on A, " says our interlocutor.

Particularly careful wiretap victims prefer to turn off their phone during an important conversation or hide it far away. The ability to record via the phone in standby mode exists, but this technology is rarely used. "In these cases, the so-called microphone effect is used. This can only be done if a team of specialists works in close proximity to the interlocutors. The signal receiver and recording device must be located somewhere nearby," he explains.

With analysis of Internet traffic of suspicious citizens (SORM-2) the security forces are still somewhat worse off than with wiretapping conversations. Although telecom operators also provide intelligence agencies with any information, the analysis of this data itself is quite complex. Any smartphone constantly downloads and sends a huge amount of data. Until recently, there was a huge problem in isolating interesting information from all this mass, for example, correspondence in Skype. However, now this problem has been solved in general, and even in the regions they have learned to read Internet messengers

Maybe the security forces would like to "listen to everyone", but in reality, only 200-300 people in Yekaterinburg are under constant surveillance. Most of them are suspected of extremism (primarily of an Islamist nature) and terrorism, members of organized criminal groups under development, participants in large-scale opaque financial transactions ("cashers", etc.). Only no more than 10% of the total mass of" supervised " people listen to political orders, the expert told us. "They definitely listen to the governor, his inner circle, top officials of the city.

Recently, there is another proven way to become a victim of wiretapping-to regularly criticize the current government or go to protest demonstrations. Of course, all participants of street actions will not be listened to, but the most active ones will be completely ignored.

Recently, an increasingly significant role in the structure ofСОРМ plays an analysis of information collected in social networks. Special services have access to all correspondence conducted in Russian social networks, the expert claims. With Facebook, the situation is more complicated, but even here the secrecy of communication is not guaranteed. A relatively safe way to communicate is through Western mail services - for example, Gmail or instant messengers - for example, Telegram.

A rare Russian businessman and politician today discusses on the phone something more important than fishing and football. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the actual texts of negotiations, electronic intelligence professionals are engaged in processing large amounts of data, identifying mathematical patterns, implicit connections, and building hypotheses about the interaction of certain groups or persons on this basis. This can be done through phone calls, emails, banking transactions, operations involving the registration or liquidation of legal entities, etc.

Perlustration of electronic correspondence, monitoring of telephone conversations have already gone as far as the authors of dystopian novels could not dream of. Perhaps this is the power of SORM helps prevent genuine terrorist attacks or real crimes. But for the public, it is much more noticeable when electronic intelligence methods are used for political prosecution and have nothing to do with legal procedures. At the same time, not only the opposition, but also politicians loyal to the Kremlin suffer from uncontrolled surveillance. Dirt collected by electronic means often becomes an instrument of elite struggle against those who recently ordered the wiretapping of their enemies. In this sense, electronic intelligence has become a danger from which no one is immune.
 
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