The TOR (The Onion Router) project began in the mid-1990s as a research initiative of the U.S. Navy at the Naval Research Laboratory, which aimed to create a system capable of providing anonymous data transmission over the Internet. It is known that the project has been funded for many years by various US government organizations, the US State Department, the Soros Open Society Foundations, the US Department of Defense, and so on... The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) also had a hand in the study of anonymous networks.
For many years, the "safe" onion net, under the strict supervision of the US military, has met the needs of anonymous communication on the Internet, but the situation has changed only recently.
On Sept. 19, DARPA announced a new program called Provably Weird Network Deployment and Detection (PWND²), which aims to fundamentally change the way we deploy and detect so-called hidden networks using a combination of formal methods and software-defined networking (SDN).
DARPA is concerned that countries such as China, Russia, and Iran have begun to effectively monitor and block Internet communications used to promote "free speech." For example, China invests significant resources in detecting and blocking traffic from the same onion network, using DPI and other technologies to identify/filter traffic.
Why does DARPA want to change its approach? And why complicate it?
TOR was not originally developed using formal methods that provide mathematical proofs of safety. Instead, its security and anonymity are based on practical implementations of cryptographic protocols. Protocols provide a high level of privacy, but cannot guarantee resistance to all possible types of attacks, since there is no formal proof of their security.
From a technical point of view, PWND² focuses on the development of "weird networks" – hidden or unintentional communication paths that arise in pre-existing networks. Examples of such networks include DNS tunneling (such as the iodine tool), obfuscated channels from the DARPA RACE project, and censorship bypass plugins.
PWND², unlike TOR, is based on 3 pillars - formal methods, SDN and guarantees of resistance to attacks, while providing mathematical proofs of the security and privacy of hidden communication systems, and the flexibility of the system allows you to more effectively counteract blocking attempts by a conditional censor.
The new program builds on the success of the previous initiative, RACE (Resilient Anonymous Communication for Everyone), which aimed to develop sustainable and anonymous communication systems. The project is designed for 30 months and includes the development of a domain-specific language (DSL). In addition to developing DSLs, the program focuses on creating formal analysis tools that will allow you to verify key properties of these systems, such as performance, security, privacy, and scalability. Particular attention is paid to networks operating in layers 3-5 of the stack TCP/IP, excluding the physical and link layers. This is due to the fact that most covert communications arise precisely at these levels, where obfuscated and hard-to-detect communication channels can be implanted.
If we hypothetically assume that the project will work, then on the basis of PWND², the US military will have perfectly controlled "anonymous" projects, both small and mass products (which will definitely be promoted). It is assumed that "secure" networks will be an ideal environment for communication, recruitment, and transfer of secret information when interacting with citizens from Iran, China, and Russia under the sign of "freedom of speech".
For many years, the "safe" onion net, under the strict supervision of the US military, has met the needs of anonymous communication on the Internet, but the situation has changed only recently.
On Sept. 19, DARPA announced a new program called Provably Weird Network Deployment and Detection (PWND²), which aims to fundamentally change the way we deploy and detect so-called hidden networks using a combination of formal methods and software-defined networking (SDN).
DARPA is concerned that countries such as China, Russia, and Iran have begun to effectively monitor and block Internet communications used to promote "free speech." For example, China invests significant resources in detecting and blocking traffic from the same onion network, using DPI and other technologies to identify/filter traffic.
Why does DARPA want to change its approach? And why complicate it?
TOR was not originally developed using formal methods that provide mathematical proofs of safety. Instead, its security and anonymity are based on practical implementations of cryptographic protocols. Protocols provide a high level of privacy, but cannot guarantee resistance to all possible types of attacks, since there is no formal proof of their security.
From a technical point of view, PWND² focuses on the development of "weird networks" – hidden or unintentional communication paths that arise in pre-existing networks. Examples of such networks include DNS tunneling (such as the iodine tool), obfuscated channels from the DARPA RACE project, and censorship bypass plugins.
PWND², unlike TOR, is based on 3 pillars - formal methods, SDN and guarantees of resistance to attacks, while providing mathematical proofs of the security and privacy of hidden communication systems, and the flexibility of the system allows you to more effectively counteract blocking attempts by a conditional censor.
The new program builds on the success of the previous initiative, RACE (Resilient Anonymous Communication for Everyone), which aimed to develop sustainable and anonymous communication systems. The project is designed for 30 months and includes the development of a domain-specific language (DSL). In addition to developing DSLs, the program focuses on creating formal analysis tools that will allow you to verify key properties of these systems, such as performance, security, privacy, and scalability. Particular attention is paid to networks operating in layers 3-5 of the stack TCP/IP, excluding the physical and link layers. This is due to the fact that most covert communications arise precisely at these levels, where obfuscated and hard-to-detect communication channels can be implanted.
If we hypothetically assume that the project will work, then on the basis of PWND², the US military will have perfectly controlled "anonymous" projects, both small and mass products (which will definitely be promoted). It is assumed that "secure" networks will be an ideal environment for communication, recruitment, and transfer of secret information when interacting with citizens from Iran, China, and Russia under the sign of "freedom of speech".
