The most technologically advanced robbery ever

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This article was written for educational purposes only. We do not call anyone to anything, only for information purposes! The author is not responsible for your actions
In many crime films, you can see the scene of a beautiful robbery of a bank or a cash-in-transit car. Criminals use high-tech gadgets, drill walls with laser cutters, use scout robots, cleverly disable alarms and trick motion sensors. Is it true? Are there many high-tech robberies in the real world?

It should be noted right away that the lion's share (99 out of 100) of robberies in our time is the same as 150 years ago. An armed gang of masked hijackers burst into the bank premises, put everyone on the floor, take as much money as they can, and disappear. There is one more statistical incident: almost all robbers are taken in one way or another within the next week, and it is often not possible to take advantage of the loot. Simply and uncomplicatedly, Jesse James, Butch Cassidy, John Dillinger robbed banks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; Likewise, in November 2011 in Moscow, a group of hijackers stopped a man transporting just over a million dollars in cash, laid him face down, and carefully collected the money. No technology anywhere you look. Earlier - the old faithful "Colt", now - the new faithful "Colt"

Stanley Mark Rifkin: Vaporizing Ten Million​

Today, there are not as many computer frauds with banking assets as it might seem. Serious protection methods, numerous codes, clever encryption methods, passwords pose many obstacles for hackers. Even if the money somehow "leaves" the bank, technology allows to "roll back" almost any illegal operation, if the robber did not deign to quickly cash out the funds and transfer them into gold or diamonds. The most famous heist of this kind (and one of the first) was the case of Stanley Mark Rifkin, a 32-year-old employee of a Californian consulting company. Among his clients was the computer systems service firm of the Los Angeles bank Security Pacific National. Like any other, this bank constantly made many transactions, including those abroad. Transactions could only be made by special bank employees who knew the access code, which changed daily. Taking advantage of the position of a computer consultant, Rifkin casually walked into the bank building on level D (transaction department) and memorized the code, which was written on a magnetic board with a marker.

After a while, a certain Mike Hansen, an employee of the international branch of Security Pacific National, called the bank, dictated the security code and asked for a routine transfer of money to the specified account of the Irving Trust Company in New York. Of course, there was no Hansen; Rifkin simply transferred $ 10.2 million to himself, and the bank employees did not even realize for several days that they had been robbed. During this time, Rifkin managed to buy $ 8.5 million worth of Soviet diamonds through the Swiss branch of Rusalmaz (the rest of the money went to taxes and payments for intermediaries) and transport the diamonds to the United States. They took him to the implementation a little later - then he got a pierced one. But the very fact of the "inconspicuous" robbery inspires respect.

Late 19th - early 20th century: all-in!​

The classic Polish film "Vabank" shows the canonical "silent" robbery of the mid-1930s, when alarm systems were already at a high level, but CCTV cameras and motion sensors did not yet exist. Oddly enough, "all-bank" is not at all fantastic: such robberies, in fact, took place in the history of crime. The first known robber-techie (second half of the 19th century) was the American engineer George Leslie, a New York businessman who became interested in robberies as a hobby. He developed the robbery technique, which was used after him by many professionals for more than half a century.

Leslie sketched the bank plan in as much detail as possible. To get a map of the underground premises, he rented cells and places in safes - as you know, a client of this level is taken to the bank to demonstrate the degree of security. The main place on any of his maps was occupied by a safe, as well as obstacles between the latter and the entry point. Leslie memorized the model of the safe and bought a similar one, honed the hacking procedure, and then trained his partners for a long time. In the barn, he built an exact replica of the room where the safe stood, and made his people work inside it in complete darkness, by touch. Leslie himself was never taken until the end of his life (he was killed in 1884 during a showdown), although he openly worked as a consultant for robbers for a percentage of the loot,

Skimmer: ATM Thief​

In the mid-2000s, one of the most technologically advanced types of fraud came to Russia - skimming. A skimmer is a device that looks like an overlay on an ATM machine and can read information from a plastic card. The classic skimmer is installed on the card slot; outwardly, it completely imitates an ATM part, not a single man in the street recognizes a third-party object in it. The skimmers bear the markings of the manufacturer of the respective ATM, they are made of metal of the same structure, painted in the same color.

When the user pushes the card into the slot, the skimmer reads the data from the magnetic stripe to make a duplicate. But you also need a pin code: for this, the second part of the skimmer is attached to the ATM - an overhead keyboard. Outwardly, it is impossible to guess that "native" keys are hidden under it. By dialing the PIN-code, the client automatically enters it into the skimmer's memory. There is also an easier way: installing a mini-camera that monitors the client's hands. It is used more often, as it is cheaper and less visible from the outside (the wrong keyboard can still be recognized).

A high-level skimmer is able not only to read data from a card, but also write it to another. Therefore, the fraudster simply approaches the ATM immediately after the client, inserts a blank card, pretending to withdraw money or look at the balance, and takes out a ready-made duplicate. The keypad remembers the previously entered PIN code, and the fraudster can immediately withdraw money from the client's account. In this situation, the scammers put the skimmer on for only a few hours, while they themselves wait nearby. Sometimes they work differently: they collect 20-30 combinations of "card - pin-code", and then withdraw funds from all at once. The skimmer is not even dismantled then - its cost is more than covered by the profit. A complete skimmer kit can be bought more or less freely over the Internet for about $ 3500-4000.
 
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