Cyber Calibration: How States Sometimes Turn a Blind Eye to Carding "in the Right Direction" (On Hybrid Wars and Tacit Agreements)

[Professor]

Introduction: When the Shadow Serves the Flag
In the classic model, the state is a monopolist on violence and the primary fighter against crime. However, in the era of hybrid warfare and digital sovereignty, the line between national security and organized cybercrime is becoming blurred. The phenomenon of "cyber-calibration" is emerging — the selective, targeted use of carding or its condoning to achieve geopolitical, economic, or intelligence objectives. This is a shadow zone where the state doesn't fight crime, but rather calibrates it, directing it in the "right" direction or turning a blind eye to activities that violate the law but are in line with state interests.

Chapter 1: The Doctrine of Useful Idiots and Implicit Immunity​

The most common form of calibration is passive connivance. Government agencies, primarily intelligence agencies and law enforcement, may deliberately weaken their crackdown on carding groups whose activities meet unspoken criteria:

1. Foreign policy vector: Attacks are aimed exclusively at "unfriendly" jurisdictions (the US, EU countries, geopolitical competitors). The principle: "Let them work for the external enemy; this weakens their economy and creates an operational background for us."
2. Economic criterion: Carders do not affect the domestic market (banks and citizens of their own country) and do not harm their allies. Their activities, however, bring foreign currency (cryptocurrency, cash dollars/euros) into the country, which is partially reinvested in the local economy through consumption and money laundering.
3. Technological selection: The group is of interest as a source of intellectual resources (unique exploits, methods for bypassing Western systems). Maintaining its surveillance is more valuable than immediate elimination.

Mechanism: No initiation of operations, formal investigations without real progress, leaks of information about impending raids, recruitment of key figures with offers of "cooperation" in lieu of arrest.

Examples of historical context: Analogies to the history of piracy, where the English crown turned a blind eye to filibusters plundering Spanish galleons, or to drug trafficking, where the CIA used connections with cartels to finance the Contras in Nicaragua.

Chapter 2: Active Instrumentalization: Carding as a Weapon of Hybrid Warfare​

The next step is not simply non-interference, but the indirect or direct utilization of carding infrastructure and methods for government purposes.

Application scenarios:

1. Proxy activity funding:Funds raised through targeted carding can be used for:
   • Support for pro-government hacktivist groups (such as KillNet).
   • Financing media resources, bloggers, and NGOs abroad that promote the desired narrative.
   • Sponsoring political movements in target countries.
2. Destabilization of the enemy economy: Massive, coordinated carding attacks on the target country's banking systems can undermine confidence in its financial sector, cause panic among the population, force banks to incur huge losses, and temporarily paralyze online payments.
3. Intelligence gathering: Carding methods (phishing, Trojans) are ideal for compromising specific individuals — government officials, military personnel, and defense industry employees. Stolen card data is merely a byproduct; the main goal is access to email, correspondence, and documents on the infected device.
4. Sanctions evasion: Government or quasi-government structures can use the work and channels of carders to create shadow financial schemes for conducting international payments, purchasing prohibited goods, and withdrawing capital.

The role of the state: Providing a technical and advisory base (providing vulnerabilities, covert coordination), a secure rear (guarantee against persecution) and channels for laundering the funds obtained.

Chapter 3: Cyber-Calibration Signals and Indicators​

How can you recognize that behind a carding group lies not just a thirst for profit, but political logic?

1. Geographic selectivity: The group has been active for years, but its victims are exclusively organizations and citizens of a strictly defined list of countries. Attacks on "friends" or neutrals are either absent or immediately suppressed.
2. Technical sophistication and access to exclusive tools: The use of zero-day vulnerabilities and custom, previously unseen malware suggests possible support from highly resourced organizations.
3. Strange "elusiveness": The group is highly active, its methods and nicknames are known to analysts, but law enforcement agencies in the country where it is based make no significant attempts to apprehend it. However, they are effective in apprehending groups operating in the wrong direction.
4. Symbiosis with a patriotic narrative: In the public sphere (Telegram channels, forums), the group's activities can be presented or perceived as a form of "cyber-militia" or "digital resistance."
5. Coincidence with geopolitical events: The group's activity peaks chronologically coincide with political crises, sanctions decisions, or international scandals affecting the patron country.

Chapter 4: The dangers and costs of such calibration for the state itself​

This shadow game carries serious strategic risks:

1. Boomerang effect: Techniques, tools, and personnel nurtured in such "hothouse conditions" can spiral out of control. Carders may begin to exploit themselves, damaging the domestic economy, or be bought out by other countries.
2. Loss of international legitimacy and reputational damage: The country risks becoming a "pariah state" and a "haven for cybercriminals," leading to harsh sanctions, a breakdown in law enforcement cooperation, and digital isolation.
3. Erosion of the legal framework and corruption: The practice of selective law enforcement corrodes the judicial system, encourages corruption in law enforcement agencies, and undermines citizens' faith in the rule of law. "Permitted" carding can become entwined with the bureaucracy.
4. Undermining its own cybersecurity: By enabling the growth of the carding industry, the state is unwittingly cultivating a hostile digital environment at home. These developments could be used against it in the event of a conflict with rogue groups.
5. Disruption of the domestic financial sector: Even if attacks on "one's own" are prohibited, methods and tools can leak and be used by internal criminals, which will ultimately undermine the stability of the national banking system.

Chapter 5: The Future of Calibration: Cyber-Realism vs. the Rule of Law​

The phenomenon of cybercalibration raises a fundamental question of our time: where is the line drawn between cyberrealism (the pragmatic use of any tools in the competitive struggle between states) and the principles of a state governed by the rule of law, obligated to combat crime regardless of its nature?

Possible development scenarios:

1. Escalation and normalization: Carding will finally become a recognized tool of hybrid warfare. A system of unspoken quotas and "rules of engagement" will emerge, analogous to the unwritten rules of espionage.
2. Tough action against and criminalization of sponsorship: The international community (through the UN, the Council of Europe) can develop and adopt conventions equating state sponsorship of cybercrime with an act of aggression, with all the ensuing consequences.
3. Technological parity and loss of meaning: The development of comprehensive financial cybersecurity systems (based on AI, CBDC with advanced authentication) could make mass carding technically impossible, depriving it of both criminal and geopolitical value.

Conclusion: Managed Chaos as Policy
Cybercalibration demonstrates that in the 21st century, state power is measured not only by its military and economy, but also by its ability to manage digital chaos. Carding is transformed from a public safety issue into a tool that can be turned on and off, like a silencer, directing noise toward the enemy.

However, this strategy is extremely dangerous. It assumes that the state can perpetually balance on a razor's edge, controlling forces that by their very nature seek anarchy and personal gain. History teaches that "useful idiots" sooner or later cease to be useful, but they never cease to be idiots — unpredictable and dangerous. By cultivating digital genies to unleash on their enemies, states risk forever losing control of the magic they themselves have summoned. Then the shadow they so carefully calibrated could consume them.