Agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB - how to identify an agent?

[Cloned Boy]

About agents, informants and snitches used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and other bodies in the Russian Federation against their citizens for political reasons. How to identify an agent? Is it possible to figure out an agent sent to you? How and why do people become informers? Who are informers and what is a denunciation?

Hello, friends and all those who, as they say, accidentally stumbled upon this topic. As you understood from the title of this topic, today we will talk about people who provide so-called confidential assistance to law enforcement agencies. These are various informants, agents and, in general, agents, as well as informers.

How, in my opinion, informers differ from other categories of people I named, I will also tell you today. I think that recently this topic has been very relevant, since after the start of a full-scale war against Ukraine in the Russian security systems, as I believe, the direction of work with an emphasis on various kinds of informers and informers has significantly increased.

And it should be noted that intelligence work in all operational units is organized in approximately the same way. Therefore, this topic will be primarily useful to those who are persecuted for political reasons and who fear that they may be developed using the so-called agents. You will also learn whether it is possible or not to identify an FSB or CPE agent sent to you.

Now a brief explanation. The fact is that under normal conditions, when law enforcement agencies do what they should do and what they were created for, intelligence work is a common and worldwide phenomenon. Agents are used everywhere - in Israel, the USA, Europe, and even Iran. Thanks to agents, it is possible to solve serious and especially serious crimes, catch international terrorists and know everything about the plans of crazy dictators planning a war.

It is absolutely impossible to obtain information that can be obtained, say, by technical means. This is where agents help. But only in countries with different types of dictatorships, like today's Russia, agents are used as part of a repressive mechanism against their own citizens, when ordinary informers become informers, and the culture of mass Stalinist denunciations of friends, acquaintances, relatives, teachers, and students practically takes on a new life. Work with the so-called special apparatus, that is, agent work in Russian agencies is regulated by special internal secret and top secret orders. In all departments, this is organized in approximately the same way.

The personal files of this category of people are classified as soft secret. You may ask, are there lists of informers and snitchers? Conditional lists, of course, exist, and each agency and even each department has its own. Information about them is classified as top secret everywhere. Below I will try to answer questions such as how and why people become informants, agents or snitchers, where these people are usually used, and whether it is possible to identify such informers or snitchers.

You have probably all watched American cop movies more than once, right? In them, you can often see detectives working with their informers, meeting at safe houses, paying them, giving them drinks, food, and so on in exchange for information. In Russia, operatives work with their informers in much the same way, but there are some differences from the movies.

The error is due to Russian realities and years of degradation of the law enforcement system. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, most informers are just dead weight, which is sometimes needed only for reporting and to fill the requirements of the acquisition plan with this dead weight. There is such a plan. Yes, that's right.

There is such a plan, when each operative is required to have, for example, at least three sources of one small so-called category and one or two sources of a large category. The stick system is a thing that is everywhere in Russia and it is also present in intelligence work. Some so-called sources may not even know that they are such and exist only on paper. These are the costs of the stick system. I will tell you about the delights of this stick system in my next topics.

I don't know when yet, but I will definitely do it, so wait. So, in order to answer the question of how people become agents, we should understand how Russian operatives find or acquire the so-called special apparatus. As one cheerful colonel once said, every person is a source of information.

You can always find someone who saw something, heard something or knows something, that is, every professional operative sees a participant in any event as a potential source of information, no matter who it is, a victim, a witness, an eyewitness or even a suspect, and here everything depends on the employee himself, on his professionalism and whether he can ultimately find an approach to this person, gain trust in order to subsequently obtain the necessary information with his help or he will simply be sent away.

Here, of course, I mean work on solving real crimes, but considering that all operational departments of the Russian Federation, and especially in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, work according to approximately the same templates, I am sure that, for example, the Gestapo in the Center E, who persecute citizens for political reasons, have their intelligence work organized in approximately the same way.

So, the political police officers act in much the same way. I understand that the FSB officers have a similar approach to working with agents. By the way, I realized this, including after they tried to plant their agents on me several times, sending one after another, both with and without equipment. Once in Russia there was such a case when they, that is, the FSB officers, sent a man to me, well, an old acquaintance from a former job, with a briefcase that was simply bursting with some kind of crap stuffed into it, which, by the way, immediately put me on my guard.

I must say that this man, for courage, apparently drank some alcohol. Anyway, he came up to me, purposefully, almost demonstratively turned the briefcase in my direction and started asking questions, by which I immediately, in principle, understood in what capacity he came to me. For example, one of the phrases completely killed me. Oleg, he said, you are in the opposition now, but you can, like, take me into your opposition too.

I could hardly contain my laughter and politely said goodbye to him. It looked as if he was asking to be taken into some gang or something. The guy clearly shouldn't have. In the end, he completely failed the mission, as I understand it, on infiltration. Of course, there were other, numerous more serious cases with more pronounced, so to speak, goals and with equipment that I found.

But that's not what we're talking about now. The operatives try to find most of the potential sources of information, that is, select them from the same environment that is of operational interest to them. For example, if they need information about a group of robbers, then it would be more expedient, of course, to cover this group with a person from the same environment, or to recruit a member of this group itself. If information is needed about car thefts, then they select people from among the car thieves or garage thieves.

If information is needed about drug addicts, then the sources of information will also be, respectively, drug addicts, dealers, hucksters, and so on. Accordingly, if we think logically, we can conclude that in order to obtain information about political activists, opposition politicians or groups, the Gestapo try to recruit people who are related to them, that is, from the same environment, or to introduce agents and informants selected from other directions.

Sometimes information is needed about a specific person, and then the authorities can use his close connections, even relatives or lovers, mistresses. Why do people agree to be informers? Several factors can be named here. One of the important roles here is financial interest. It is no secret that the intelligence apparatus receives money for cooperation.

Some people get paid for specific information, while others, let's say, on the basis of something like an employment contract. It's not difficult at all to interest a person with money, especially, for example, if this person has problems with drugs or alcohol. As a rule, such people need immediate income, and leaking information for a one-time or regular payment is quite a good option.

The same thing works, as we see from some articles in the media, with agents who are involved in the development of political activists, that is, by political coloring. But the money there, apparently, is completely different. As I already said, the stick system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has also penetrated into work with the intelligence apparatus. Therefore, many operatives, especially in the regions, are chasing not quality, but quantity.

Hence, it turns out that they try to attract almost anyone to cooperation, even people without intelligence capabilities. Sometimes this takes such turns that a person does not even know that he is an informant, and some particularly smart employees even manage to scribble messages on paper for them. Again, the same old stick system. Another important role in a person's decision to cooperate with the authorities is played by his desire to get some kind of concessions or to have, as he believes, a friend in the security environment.

The hope that he will be cleared someday, if, for example, he gets into trouble for breaking the law again, drives some people and becomes the reason why a person decides to cooperate. Some people in this category, as a rule, have systematic problems with the law, and they believe that by entering into a trusting relationship with the security agencies.

They can somehow protect themselves. In most cases, almost always, they are mistaken. But there are cases when people with high epaulets really try to put in a good word for some sources before the judge. The next reason why people start working for law enforcement agencies is a completely sincere desire to help in finding criminals, that is, ideological considerations.

Believe me, there are people who, out of good intentions, are ready to help and provide information about crimes, about criminals, but, unfortunately, as we see from many messages, there are also informers, driven by good intentions, in quotes, I can’t call them anything else, who actively cooperate with the EA Center or the FSB and help collect information on activists or opposition politicians.

It’s hard to say what drives such people. They probably consider it patriotic motives, but the distorted consciousness of such people has completely erased all boundaries between patriotism and slavery in their brains. Sometimes, people are also pushed to cooperate with the authorities by resentment and a desire to take revenge on the target of their development due to a failed relationship, an unshared business, or personal hostility.

A person believes that by cooperating with the authorities and leaking information about the offender, he will be able to restore, in his opinion, violated justice and, of course, take revenge on the offender. Lately, we have increasingly seen how the FSB and the employees of the Center E, who, by the way, are subordinate to the FSB, use harsh illegal recruitment methods.

What do I mean? And I am talking about persuading people to cooperate by threatening to initiate criminal cases or by blackmail. In practice, I have never encountered such recruitment methods in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system. I am convinced that they are inherent only to scumbags who work for the most part only in the centers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or in the political departments of the FSB.

A normal person, of course, will not go to work there. I think that such people, that is, such employees, are forced to do this by the understanding that under normal conditions a person who represents operational value for developments with a political tint will not cooperate with such bodies, unless he is a patriot who has gone crazy with propaganda. But this, of course, calls into question his mental and intelligence capabilities and, accordingly, the effectiveness of his work.

Therefore, as I understand it, they take by force, and those who are related to various opposition movements or groups, or they introduce such people there. But the quality, of course, fortunately, suffers greatly from this, since the relationship with the source, built on threats and blackmail, will never be trusting.

Such a person will most often stupidly feed the authorities with disinformation and, in the worst case scenario for the Gestapo, work for both sides. We can also see this, for example, when a recruited agent becomes a defector and leaks all the information about his recruiters and initiators of the development not only to the target of the development, but also to the public space. Sources recruited in this way will never work on full trust with the initiator.

Rather, on the contrary, they will look for any, even the smallest opportunity, to stab him in the back. Under normal ideal conditions, cooperation is built on trusting relationships. And here the psychological skills of the operative play a huge role. The ability to gain trust, honesty with the source and the ability to properly interest him in cooperation.

Next, I will tell you where and how Putin's repressive organs can use agents against you. The field for work and for the use of agents in Russia is now wider and more vast than ever. Let me tell you about the possible mines scattered right along the path of your possible not very pleasant pursuit.

So, you are still free. If the Gestapo have taken you into development, then the first thing they will do, along with surveillance and technical measures, such as a simpleton and so on, is try to cover you with a source or sources of information that will illuminate your, so to speak, activities.

As I have already said, they will most likely try to select sources from among your colleagues, your acquaintances, your neighbors, your friends or even your relatives, or they will try to introduce their agent or employee into your circle under By the way, in addition to obtaining information, agents can also be used to install all kinds of surveillance equipment in your home, car, office, or anywhere, in principle.

How can you understand that the person you communicate with at work, your acquaintance, your relative or neighbor works for Putin's special services? I will say right away that it is extremely difficult for an ordinary person to do this, sometimes it is completely impossible. It is easier to figure out an agent who has been introduced to your work, team or group than to figure out, for example, a recruited agent from among friends, neighbors or even relatives.

But in most cases, only the blunders of embedded informers allow you to reveal the truth. What kind of blunders can these be? If this is a person who has been introduced to you, then, as a rule, he introduces himself under a fictitious name. Sometimes, for example, during banal office conversations, he can give himself away by not responding, for example, several times to a clearly pronounced name. Of course, these can also be strange attempts at unauthorized access to where this person is denied access.

To try to figure out such an agent, I can give the following advice. More often ask the colleague who arouses your suspicions about his personal life, namely relatives, pet names, biography, trips, vacations, and so on. Repeat these same questions, but from a slightly different angle, after some time, for example, after 2-3 weeks.

If a person gives different answers to the same question, then you should be wary. A person with a fictitious biography will not be able to remember all the false answers that he gives to seemingly ordinary everyday questions. If he makes up answers to your questions, then he simply will not be able to remember all the details of the fictitious life and will definitely fail on this.

If the agent works under his real data, which is extremely rare with implanted ones, then the method with questions may not work. In this case, increased interest in you and strange behavior will be a signal for alarm. By the way, pay attention to informal communication. For example, during drinking.

If he drinks alcohol, of course, he loosens the tongue of many. How to identify an agent among acquaintances or friends? The first thing you need to remember is how you started communicating with this person. Sometimes a set-up meeting can look like a chance meeting. Again, just as in the case of agents or an agent implanted in your team, Putin's special services can implant an agent in your place under the guise of a friend or acquaintance.

That is, we try to do the same as with a suspicious colleague. But in all cases, you must act delicately and carefully, and be confident. Otherwise, in case of a mistake, at best, you can look stupid, and at worst - lose friends. What to do if the special services have recruited a person or relative who has been your friend, acquaintance or just a colleague since childhood.

That is, when the function of leaking information is no longer performed by an embedded agent with fictitious data about himself, but by a real person. On the one hand, in such cases it is extremely difficult to understand that the person is informing on you, unless, of course, he himself tells you about it. But understand one thing. If a person shares your views and supports you in your activities, then he is unlikely to become a target for recruitment by the authorities, unless, of course, he has some big, absolutely huge problems.

Another thing is when your political views differ from his political views. This is what the special services will most likely take advantage of. Trust gained over the years can easily be used against you. But, on the other hand, such agents, in my opinion, do not have sufficient training and professional skills.

Therefore, they can give themselves away. Of course, you should not rely on this alone. Strange behavior of a person, for example, strange questions and a sudden interest in your activities, which was not observed before, may indicate work for repressive bodies, but not always. You should also pay attention to whether such a person was detained recently, that is, whether he had any arrests or deliveries to the authorities, and for what reasons he was there, where, by the way, he could have been recruited.

If you suspect a loved one of working for the authorities, try to talk to him directly about it. Build your conversations sincerely and on trust. A long-standing acquaintance with such a person can help you, and you will be able to understand where he is lying and where he is telling the truth.

How to identify a possible agent from among your neighbors? Again, there may be several options here. The authorities will recruit one of your neighbors who has been living next to you for a long time and with whom you have a trusting relationship. The same approach here as with friends or acquaintances. You also need to pay attention to how long he has been living next to you, that is, your neighbor.

Has he lived in the neighboring apartment all his life or has he just arrived the other day. If he has been living there for a long time, then, again, you need to pay attention to whether he shares your position or is a stupid Z-patriot with a St. George ribbon on his chest. If he has recently arrived and obsessively wants to get closer to you, then we use the same method as with possible infiltration. We ask the same questions after a certain period of time.

The next step, the next stage - you got to the department, for interrogation or questioning, it doesn't matter. Sometimes during breaks you can be let out for smokers, sit on a bench, you shouldn't talk to anyone there, because the same as you, at first glance, detainees can be ordinary agents who make up their stories especially for you in order to get you to the right conversation, and can even record you on a dictaphone.

The thing is that later such people can be used as witnesses in court against you. Here, I think, everything is simple. You don't even have to try to figure anyone out. Just keep quiet. The next stage. You were put in a special detention center or a temporary detention facility. The situation is similar to what I just told you about the bench and the smoking room. An agent can also be put in your cell.

His goal will be to establish a trusting relationship with you with the subsequent receipt of information according to the assignment and pass it on to the initiator. Then the same person can also be used by the authorities against you in court. The next old story. You were sent to a pretrial detention center or, God forbid, to a penal colony.

Everything is about the same as in the SVS, but the only difference may be that the agents may already be people who have actually been caught and are in a pretrial detention center or serving a sentence, who work for the operational department of the pretrial detention center or the operational department of the penal colony, who receive certain perks for this. How can you identify agents who will sit in the same cell with you? A person who has ended up in a cell for the first time will hardly be able to do this.

After all, the question of the cellmate's father, why you were locked up, is completely normal and natural, and does not say anything at all. You should not try to somehow identify such agents there. In this case, in order not to aggravate your situation and not give the Gestapo a reason to charge you even more, that is, in another criminal case with a political tint, it is better to adhere to the rule of not saying anything unnecessary, since even if your interlocutor does not work for the operational department, there may certainly be listening devices in the cells. I will say separately about the investigation stage and the trial. The agents who have been with you all this time can be used as witnesses already at the investigation stage and, accordingly, later in court.

I know for sure that the agencies widely practice the use of so-called "encrypted" witnesses both at the investigation stage and in court, in which capacity agents, informants and other special apparatus act. Therefore, the agents sent to you in the end will play at least two roles. They will not only leak all the information about you and your associates to the Gestapo, but will also act as witnesses against you in a criminal case.

Another important point. Don't take all this to the point of paranoia. Think and act rationally, weigh all the data you have several times. Don't see every person around you as an FSB agent or an agent of the AE Center. You need to approach everything wisely and with cold calculation. Try not to jump to conclusions based on emotions.

Collect more data before you come to the conclusion that this particular person is really an agent. And now, as I promised, I will tell you what, in my opinion, is the difference between ordinary agents, informants and snitches. As I said earlier, in every country, law enforcement agencies work with agents. We know this from open source publications, articles, news, and historical documents.

Working with agents allows us to solve and prevent crimes, prevent terrorist attacks and save people's lives, and learn the aggressor's plans before an attack. This is what they should be used for under normal conditions. And this is completely normal. But in Putin's Russia, as in other current dictatorships or dictatorships that have gone down in shame into history, agents are used for political persecution.

This can be seen, for example, in Soviet history, especially in the Stalinist period, when denunciations were one of the inseparable bonds on which power was held. We are seeing the same thing now under Putin, when the culture of almost Stalinist denunciations is being revived and is becoming the bond that holds power for today's fascist regime in Russia.

When relatives inform on each other, teachers inform on students, students inform on teachers, and those who do not inform are now also informed on, and they are held accountable for not informing.

So, what is a denunciation in the classical sense of the word? A denunciation is a secret message to state authorities about such actions of citizens that are not criminal or socially reprehensible from the point of view of society or morality or the civilized democratic world, but which these authorities and the state in which they work consider as such.

The difference from informers from ordinary snitches, agents and informants who work to solve crimes is that informers, unlike them, receive and transmit information about citizens whom the state persecutes for political reasons or for their different state point of view. A precise example of this is denunciations of people with an anti-war position. And we see that in modern Russian law enforcement agencies, especially after the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, most of the work of the intelligence apparatus was expectedly focused on denunciations.

That's all I have for today, I think I've told you the main thing. Ask questions in the comments. That is, I publish information quickly. No one will deceive you here.