Digital Identity 2030+: A New Landscape of Trust Where Carding Isn't Dying, It's Mutating

[Professor]

The Future of Digital Identity: Will Biometrics and State-Owned ID Systems Kill Carding?​

Biometrics (face, fingerprint, voice) and government-issued digital IDs (eIDAS in the EU, India Stack Aadhaar) are not "carding killers," but rather powerful catalysts for the transformation of the entire digital trust ecosystem. They won't eliminate fraud, but they will raise the bar so high that mass, amateur carding will die out, giving way to highly targeted, insider, and state-sponsored attacks. Carding won't die — it will become different, more expensive, and more politicized.

How Biometrics and eID Are Changing the Game (Positive Impact)​

1. The death of anonymous fraud "from scratch": It's impossible to create a "fake person" from scratch if linking a card or account requires verification through a government portal with biometrics . This kills classic full-seal carding.
2. Linking an action to a unique identity: A transaction can require real-time biometric verification (Face ID, fingerprint) linked to a government-issued ID. This greatly complicates the use of stolen card data (knowing the CVV is not enough — you need to be that person).
3. Creating a unified, verified trust graph: The state eID becomes the root of trust . All accounts (bank, tax office, stores) are linked to it. Hacking one account prevents access to others if biometric verification is required.

New vulnerabilities and attack vectors (negative effect)​

The system becomes stronger, but its single points of failure become critical targets.

1. Attacks on biometrics and eID infrastructure:
   • Biometric template leaks: Fingerprints and facial recognition cannot be changed like passwords. Their theft from government databases poses a lifelong threat to a person.
   • Spoofing and deepfake attacks: Using 3D masks and high-quality deepfake videos to bypass facial recognition. Using "master fingerprints" or fake fingerprints for fingerprinting.
   • Algorithm attacks: Using adversarial examples — specially generated images that the system sees as the "owner," while a human sees as noise.
2. Insider threats and corruption in government agencies:
   • The most dangerous vector: An employee with access to a digital identification system can create "ghosts" (legitimate paper IDs for non-existent individuals) or "clone" digital identities by passing off one biometric template as another in exchange for a bribe.
   • This isn't hypothetical: cases of driver's licenses and passports being sold by government agencies exist today, and in the digital age, their price and danger will skyrocket.
3. Attacks on integration and the last mile:
   • A bank or store may use eID for initial verification, but then revert to passwords or SMS OTPs for convenience . A fraudster who hacks an account through phishing gains access, bypassing biometrics on a permanent basis.
   • Social engineering to relink: Trick the support team into resetting the account's link to the eID and linking it to a new identity controlled by the scammer ("I lost my phone with the eID").
4. State carding and surveillance:The darkest prospect.
   • Carding as a tool of intelligence agencies: States can use their monopoly on identification for targeted financial sabotage or surveillance of dissidents by "freezing" their digital identities or conducting transactions in their name.
   • Authoritarianism of convenience: A system created to combat crime can be used for complete financial control over the population (social rating, blocking the accounts of undesirables).

The Carding Economy in a New Era: Who Will Survive?​

1. The Death of "Freelancers": Mass, low-skill carding based on the purchase of full-zills will disappear . It will no longer be "simple" to buy data and place an order.
2. The rise of targeted, multi-stage attacks (APT-style fraud):Groups that will be able to:
   • Steal/forge biometrics of a specific victim (through deep phishing with camera session hijacking, data theft from medical centers).
   • Infiltrate insiders into banks, mobile operators, or government agencies that issue eIDs.
   • Conduct complex, combined attacks where hacking a digital identity is just the first step to gaining access to loans or transfers to shell companies.
3. Shift into adjacent niches:
   • New digital asset scams : NFTs, tokenized real estate, digital identities (DIDs).
   • Attacks on decentralized systems (DeFi), where authentication is weaker and the amounts involved are huge.
   • Exploiting "blind spots": International transfers where the eID systems of different countries are not integrated.

The Future: Digital Identity as a Battleground​

By 2030+, we will see not the end of carding, but its evolution into a "cyberwar of identities" where:

• State centralized systems (eID, biometric databases).
• Enterprise trust systems (Apple/Google/Meta as identity providers).
• Decentralized identifiers (DIDs) on the blockchain offer privacy but are difficult for mass adoption.
• Organized cybercrime attacks all three models.

Carding will evolve from "theft of card data" to "theft or usurpation of a digitally sovereign identity." Profits will come not from purchasing an iPhone, but from obtaining loans in a person's name, selling their assets, or using their identity for other crimes.

Bottom line: Biometrics and eID aren't killing carding. They're legitimizing it, making it the preserve of the elite.​

Carding will not die completely because:

1. The cost of hacking a system is always > 0. There is no such thing as perfect protection.
2. The human factor and corruption are eternal.
3. Economic inequality and incentives for cheating will not go away.

They create a world where:

• For the honest citizen, online payments will become safer and more convenient.
• The path will be closed for the former lone carder.
• New, larger and more dangerous opportunities will open up for well-funded criminal syndicates and hostile states.

The future of digital identity isn't a fraud-free utopia. It's a transition from the chaotic theft of "wallets" to a systemic, high-level struggle for control over citizens' "digital passports." Carding won't die. It will become state-owned.