TorPolice is a new platform for enforcing access control policies over the Tor network
The Tor network is the most popular anonymity network currently used by millions of users around the world. However, access control does not exist for users of the Tor network, making the network vulnerable to malicious attacks and botnet abuse. For example, adversaries often use relay nodes as stepping for various forms of malicious attacks, forcing service providers to use captcha to exit IP addresses, leading to severe usability issues for honest Tor users.
To mitigate this problem, a group of researchers recently proposed "TorPolice"; primarily to maintain privacy controls for Tor. TorPolice gives Tor universal access control for relay nodes; thus maximizing Thor's immunity against botnet attacks. The platform developers tested the TorPolice prototype, which proved that it can significantly improve the privacy of Tor network users.
TorPolice goals:
TorPolice works by adding access control to anonymous connections that take place on the Tor network, which is beneficial to both service providers and the Tor network. In addition to the previously proposed capability-based structures, the TorPolice structure is designed to mitigate three issues;
1 Keeping Tor users anonymous.
2 Prevent the creation of central control points.
3 Creation of a progressive structure.
Service-defined access policies: Nearly 70% of all Tor relay nodes are listed as Project Honey Pot spammers, which has caused a large number of service providers and content delivery networks (CDNs) to filter and block network traffic leaving Tor. TorPolice is designed to enable service providers to define and enforce specific access rules for all forms of Tor connections, allowing them to prevent Tor emissions from malicious attacks while still offering service to honest Tor users. Thus, TorPolice is a robust framework that allows service providers to define their own specific access policy.
Preventing botnet attacks over Tor is it feasible?
As the Tor network is a form-provider, it is vulnerable to botnet attacks; which rely on control (C&C) servers hosted in the form of Torah anonymous services, as well as DDoS attacks targeting selected relay nodes. TorPolice allows the Tor network to control how Tor clients use the network, thus protecting the network from abuse. In addition to the local speed limit of each relay node, the access control algorithm provided by TorPolice is global, that is, the adversary cannot bypass the infrastructure protection through the connection to all the relay nodes.
Maintaining the privacy of Tor users:
TorPolice does not undermine Tor's guarantees of anonymity. Although it adds a new functional level; access control, this layer pushes the activity of the Tor user away from his personality; thus preserving the online anonymity of Tor users.
Fully decentralized and partially trusted authorities:
In line with Tor's design goal, TorPolice relies on a group of fully decentralized but partially trusted access authorities (AAs) to oversee various possibilities. Access Control (AA) is managed by either the Tor Project or a trusted intermediary (third party). While Tor users can choose any AA to access various features, no AA has a universal view of all Tor users. Moreover, each of the available AAS is only partially trusted and as soon as the AA acts dishonestly or becomes compromised, the service provider will ignore it.
Phased execution:
TorPolice is being implemented in stages. Modern Tor users, relay nodes and service providers will immediately benefit from the partial implementation of TorPolice. On the other hand, obsolete objects will continue to perform their operations.
Realized goals of TorPolice:
Several forms of attacks work to break Thor's inaccessibility. For example, an adversary can de-anonymize the actions of a Tor user on the network, provided that he can control the outbound and inbound traffic of the network. TorPolice is not designed to mitigate these forms of immunity attacks. Instead, it simply retains the decoupling guarantees provided by the Tor network.
The creators of TorPolice estimate that they have proven that their prototype can significantly reduce the number of botnet abuse in the Tor network, as well as minimize attacks targeting the Tor network.
Chipollino Onion Club TorPolice - New Platform for Enforcing Access Control Policy over the Tor Network
The Tor network is the most popular anonymity network currently used by millions of users around the world. However, access control does not exist for users of the Tor network, making the network vulnerable to malicious attacks and botnet abuse. For example, adversaries often use relay nodes as stepping for various forms of malicious attacks, forcing service providers to use captcha to exit IP addresses, leading to severe usability issues for honest Tor users.
To mitigate this problem, a group of researchers recently proposed "TorPolice"; primarily to maintain privacy controls for Tor. TorPolice gives Tor universal access control for relay nodes; thus maximizing Thor's immunity against botnet attacks. The platform developers tested the TorPolice prototype, which proved that it can significantly improve the privacy of Tor network users.
TorPolice goals:
TorPolice works by adding access control to anonymous connections that take place on the Tor network, which is beneficial to both service providers and the Tor network. In addition to the previously proposed capability-based structures, the TorPolice structure is designed to mitigate three issues;
1. Keeping Tor users anonymous.
2. Prevent the creation of central control points.
3. Creation of a progressive structure.
Service-defined access policies: Nearly 70% of all Tor relay nodes are listed as Project Honey Pot spammers, which has caused a large number of service providers and content delivery networks (CDNs) to filter and block network traffic leaving Tor. TorPolice is designed to enable service providers to define and enforce specific access rules for all forms of Tor connections, allowing them to prevent Tor emissions from malicious attacks while still offering service to honest Tor users. Thus, TorPolice is a robust framework that allows service providers to define their own specific access policy.
Preventing botnet attacks over Tor is it feasible?
As the Tor network is a form-provider, it is vulnerable to botnet attacks; which rely on control (C&C) servers hosted in the form of Torah anonymous services, as well as DDoS attacks targeting selected relay nodes. TorPolice allows the Tor network to control how Tor clients use the network, thus protecting the network from abuse. In addition to the local speed limit of each relay node, the access control algorithm provided by TorPolice is global, that is, the adversary cannot bypass the infrastructure protection through the connection to all the relay nodes.
Maintaining the privacy of Tor users:
TorPolice does not undermine Tor's guarantees of anonymity. Although it adds a new functional level; access control, this layer pushes the activity of the Tor user away from his personality; thus preserving the online anonymity of Tor users.
Fully decentralized and partially trusted authorities:
In line with Tor's design goal, TorPolice relies on a group of fully decentralized but partially trusted access authorities (AAs) to oversee various possibilities. Access Control (AA) is managed by either the Tor Project or a trusted intermediary (third party). While Tor users can choose any AA to access various features, no AA has a universal view of all Tor users. Moreover, each of the available AAS is only partially trusted and as soon as the AA acts dishonestly or becomes compromised, the service provider will ignore it.
Phased execution:
TorPolice is being implemented in stages. Modern Tor users, relay nodes and service providers will immediately benefit from the partial implementation of TorPolice. On the other hand, obsolete objects will continue to perform their operations.
Realized goals of TorPolice:
Several forms of attacks work to break Thor's inaccessibility. For example, an adversary can de-anonymize the actions of a Tor user on the network, provided that he can control the outbound and inbound traffic of the network. TorPolice is not designed to mitigate these forms of immunity attacks. Instead, it simply retains the decoupling guarantees provided by the Tor network.
