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Tenable has identified a serious vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Composer that could be used for remote code execution in real-world attacks.
GCP Composer is a managed service for automating and controlling workflows in the cloud, widely used to organize data and run applications in distributed environments. It allows users to create complex data processing scenarios by providing integration with other Google Cloud services.
The vulnerability was codenamed CloudImposer and was associated with a supply chain attack tactic known as Dependency Confusion. Liv Matan, a security researcher at Tenable, explained that attackers are able to intercept internal dependencies that Google presets on all GCP Composer instances, which opens up the possibility of injecting malicious code into cloud workflows.
Dependency Confusion is an attack technique in which package managers download a fake package from a public repository instead of an internal one if the fake package has a higher version. This vulnerability was first described by researcher Alex Birsan in 2021 and has already caused serious incidents in software supply chains.
According to Tenable, the problem was that the attackers could upload a fake package to the Python Package Index (PyPI) public repository called 'google-cloud-datacatalog-lineage-producer-client.' This package could be automatically installed on all instances of GCP Composer with elevated privileges, which created a wide range of opportunities for attackers.
Despite the fact that GCP Composer uses fixed versions of packages, the researchers found that when using the "pip install" command with the "--extra-index-url" argument, the system gave priority to public repositories, allowing attackers to carry out a dependency spoofing attack. As a result, they could not only execute arbitrary code, but also access credentials and other Google Cloud services.
After responsibly disclosing the problem in January 2024, Google released a fix in May. Packages are now downloaded exclusively from private repositories, and checksum checking has been introduced for additional protection. Google also recommended that developers use the "--index-url" argument instead of "--extra-index-url" to minimize the risk of supply chain attacks.
Source
GCP Composer is a managed service for automating and controlling workflows in the cloud, widely used to organize data and run applications in distributed environments. It allows users to create complex data processing scenarios by providing integration with other Google Cloud services.
The vulnerability was codenamed CloudImposer and was associated with a supply chain attack tactic known as Dependency Confusion. Liv Matan, a security researcher at Tenable, explained that attackers are able to intercept internal dependencies that Google presets on all GCP Composer instances, which opens up the possibility of injecting malicious code into cloud workflows.
Dependency Confusion is an attack technique in which package managers download a fake package from a public repository instead of an internal one if the fake package has a higher version. This vulnerability was first described by researcher Alex Birsan in 2021 and has already caused serious incidents in software supply chains.
According to Tenable, the problem was that the attackers could upload a fake package to the Python Package Index (PyPI) public repository called 'google-cloud-datacatalog-lineage-producer-client.' This package could be automatically installed on all instances of GCP Composer with elevated privileges, which created a wide range of opportunities for attackers.
Despite the fact that GCP Composer uses fixed versions of packages, the researchers found that when using the "pip install" command with the "--extra-index-url" argument, the system gave priority to public repositories, allowing attackers to carry out a dependency spoofing attack. As a result, they could not only execute arbitrary code, but also access credentials and other Google Cloud services.
After responsibly disclosing the problem in January 2024, Google released a fix in May. Packages are now downloaded exclusively from private repositories, and checksum checking has been introduced for additional protection. Google also recommended that developers use the "--index-url" argument instead of "--extra-index-url" to minimize the risk of supply chain attacks.
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