MIFARE Classic - EVERYTHING: Carders already know how to get access to your cards

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The Crypto-1 encryption algorithm has not stood the test of time.

In July 2024, cybersecurity experts discovered a new vulnerability in MIFARE Classic contactless card technology, which is widely used in transport systems, access systems and other critical areas. This technology has long attracted the attention of both researchers and attackers, but recent discoveries have shown that the vulnerability may be more serious than previously thought.

Researchers from the French company Quarkslab conducted a detailed analysis of the Crypto-1 encryption algorithm, which is used in MIFARE Classic cards to protect data. This algorithm was developed in the 1990s and has been considered obsolete for several years, but is still widely used. New attack methods, such as improved brute-force and side-channel attacks, make it much easier for attackers to break through defenses and clone maps.

In particular, experts found that an attack on one of the weaknesses of the Crypto-1 algorithm allows you to quickly calculate the encryption key, which gives attackers access to all the data stored on the card. Using special hardware and software tools, such as Proxmark3, attackers can clone the map in just a few minutes.

This situation is a serious concern for organizations that depend on the use of MIFARE Classic cards for security. These organizations include transportation systems in major cities, universities, commercial companies, and even government agencies.

Experts strongly recommend that all users of this technology as soon as possible consider switching to more modern solutions, such as MIFARE DESFire, which use more reliable encryption algorithms, for example, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).

In addition, experts note that the problem affects not only access systems, but also other areas where MIFARE Classic cards are used, such as payment, identification and control systems. Companies that use outdated cards may face serious financial and reputational risks if their systems are compromised.

In this regard, many companies and organizations have started an urgent review of their security systems. Some of them have already started to gradually upgrade their infrastructure, which will require significant costs, but in the long run will avoid more serious problems.

The researchers also emphasize that the use of outdated technologies in critical security systems is unacceptable in today's conditions, when cyber threats are becoming more sophisticated. To ensure security and prevent possible attacks, it is necessary to switch to modern technologies that can provide a high level of data protection.

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Researcher Philip Touwen of Quarkslab found hardware backdoors in RFID key cards produced by Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, a large Chinese company.

The vulnerabilities allow attackers to clone vulnerable smart cards created using NXP's MIFARE Classic chips in minutes and gain access to protected areas.

Chips have been on the market since 1994 and have been widely used over the past decades to create smart cards and access keys in hotels, banks, government buildings, factories and many other facilities.

In such a long time on the market, researchers have managed to find several ways to break their encryption and clone MIRAGE-based cards, as in the case of Darkside, Nested Authentication, Hardnested, or Static Nested attacks.

Over the years, manufacturers have developed improved versions of their smart cards designed to improve security and prevent some of the detected attacks.

The two most popular card designs are the FM11RF08 and FM11RF08S variants, where the S stands for "enhanced security version."

However, an article published by Quarkslab claims that in the process of investigating the FM11RF08S map, a new secret backdoor built into Fudan maps was discovered.

It was unsheathed by checking the map's command sets, which noticed that the map was bulk responding to undocumented instructions within a certain range.

Apparently, all FM11RF08S are implementing an authentication backdoor command with a unique key for the entire production that the researchers were able to extract: for Fudan FM11RF08S - A396EFA4E24F cards.

Continuing his research, Philip Touwen also discovered a similar universal authentication key for older FM11RF08 cards – A31667A8CEC1.

In addition, it turned out that the errors flowed smoothly into many other Fudan card models, such as FM11RF32 and FM1208-10, as well as Infineon and NXP, which is likely due to borrowing technology from the Chinese company.

According to Toiven, the vulnerability appears to have been around since 2007, which means that many cards and passkeys from the past 17 years can be cloned in a matter of seconds.