To understand the possibilities of breaking communications, you need to know the enemy.
This is where two divisions of the service come into play - the OTD (operational technical department) and the OSD (operational search department). The capabilities of each division are limited and clearly divided, so if it is necessary to avoid attention, you can always find ways around it.
When an employee needs to obtain information on an object engaged in illegal activity, everything is taken into account.
In addition to the dirty laundry, any information about a potential criminal that can be used in one way or another to achieve their goals is of interest.
Cheating, buying illegal goods, forging documents, tax evasion, even traffic violations. All the information that the operative can accumulate on a person, he begins to scrupulously accumulate, initially collecting from official sources with requests, checking databases and archives, making inquiries, scouring social networks and the vastness of the Runet, connecting connections and acquaintances who can provide characteristics and any other information.
The activities carried out by these departments already violate the constitutional rights of citizens and require a court sanction to carry them out. But let's not forget that we are talking about our country, and such sanctions, as a rule, are formal in nature, unless, of course, we are talking about work on Gref and other figures and oligarchs.
In such cases, the judge will cover his ass to the last and will require the operative to provide a mandatory full justification for the need for such activities, with arguments and evidence that the object is involved in illegal activities. If we are talking about ordinary citizens or businessmen, the justification is written formally.
It is possible that left-wing names will be added to the list of real objects, if the operative needs, for example, to wiretap someone of his own or needs to resolve certain personal issues. Often, such sanctions are issued "retroactively", when in fact wiretapping and a set of measures have already been carried out. Here again, it is extremely important to have a strong lawyer who knows such principles of work and can prove that the sanction was received retroactively.
When the court's sanction is received, the OSD starts implementing a set of measures. First of all, this is wiretapping and reading SMS. Here the possibilities are wide and the methods have long been technically developed.
Knowing the subscriber's number, it is not a problem to calculate the IMEI of the handset from which calls are made, and knowing this data, the office will already see all the SIM cards entering the handset. In addition, there is a set of measures aimed at calculating other numbers connecting to the network simultaneously with the base number. This is how the object's left SIM cards are calculated if he uses another handset for business.
The calculation is carried out by cross-analysis of the volume of numbers simultaneously displayed in the sought cells. As soon as the operative sees periodically repeated coincidences in the appearance in the cell with the base number of the same number, he puts it on wiretapping too, and asks the operator for the numbers of base stations to compare them with the movements of the main number. On average, such an event takes 3-4 days.
In addition to remote wiretapping, the office needs to monitor the entire flow of traffic used, which is done through the service provider, so that the operative can see on a daily basis what sites the subject visits, how much time he spends on them and whether he is trying to cover his tracks on the network.
Russian Post is rarely used now, but, nevertheless, the operative will maintain full control of all shipments/receipts through any courier services and mail in your name. And despite the sealing of the parcel in the Russian Post office in your presence, in marked tape and your personal packaging, the parcel will be opened and packed identically to the original packaging, if necessary, again by colleagues from the OSD trained for this.
When the operative understands that the remote channels of control of the object do not provide a sufficient evidence base, then he needs full access to the phone.
Here it is necessary to involve the administrative resource and, as a rule, the work goes according to one of two scenarios:
Openly, when the operative invites the object to the office to clarify some issues, possibly unrelated to the case, but falling within his area of competence.
The second scenario is “under a false flag”, when a similar invitation is made to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Tax Service, Federal Bailiff Service, Pension Fund or any government agency as, for example, a witness, but where an access control system is organized. The purpose of such a visit is one - the object, upon entering the building, must leave the phone in a storage cell, the key to which will allegedly be only with him.
Then, according to the well-worn scenario - while the operative distracts the object, the OSD employees will copy the information from the phone and set up a remote access system to synchronize all actions. The ideal option in this case is if the object came to the meeting with a laptop, notebook, notepad. All of the above is similarly studied, photographed and copied.
Here the advice is simple - you need to enter the building either with a left-hand phone, or leave it before entering the building, and not in the car that you left in the parking lot near the office building.
And immediately indicate that you do not have much time. The above-described activities take about an hour, depending on the volume of copied information, so it is worth paying attention to the behavior of the operative. If he tries to drag out time, while periodically distracted by the phone, which is used to coordinate the activities of colleagues with the OSD, you should leave their conversations.
By the way, Apple's statements about invulnerability are useful for marketing, but not for the special services. Without going into the intricacies of the technical process of gaining access, I can say that bypassing fingerprint protection takes 30 minutes with specialized software. But still, it provides some protection. Firstly, because it drags out time, secondly, because not all departments have special software for Apples. In particular, this concerns the regions, and there the issue of gaining access to apples is more acute, which often comes down to inviting colleagues from Moscow, and this will depend entirely on the importance of the object. That is, for the sake of a fraud of 5-10 million, Moscow will not hire a group.
Next comes the penetration into the home. Access to a laptop or PC can be obtained by understanding the daily routine of the target and knowing when and how long he will be away from home. The ideal option if you are staying in a hotel. The questions are worked out at the proper level and it is not difficult to enter the room to conduct a full examination, check all the records, personal belongings, copy information from the laptop, and also set up an audio-video recording. As a rule, a regular plasma TV is used for this, which is replaced with ours, stuffed with technology instead of the standard one, in advance of your check-in. And in hotels, it is extremely difficult to detect recording devices.
Things are a little more complicated with personal property. Here, master keys and hacking specialists come to the rescue, which a normal operative should always have and, as a rule, colleagues from the Federal Penitentiary Service help select such people. It is possible to penetrate the apartment through the balconies of neighbors; sometimes the practice of attracting individual industrial climbers is used. There are many difficulties here and it is quite possible to secure your home - it is enough to install good doors with modern locks, preferably not factory ones, but expensive, non-standard ones, and always close all available doors and windows when leaving.
It is also useful to maintain friendly relations with neighbors so that if anything happens, they can warn you about any visits and inquiries about you.
Penetration activities are planned several weeks in advance, sometimes a month in advance, and are meticulously worked out taking into account a huge number of factors, so maneuvers to ensure security are quite possible. The level of significance should also be taken into account. If you are engaged in espionage, financing "bearded ones", or have established a regular supply channel for illegal drugs, there will be ways to get into the apartment. If the activity does not promise the operative a sharp promotion or an extraordinary rank, it will be enough for him to remotely remove information about you with the involvement of colleagues from the OSD in the development.
OSD employees are engaged in operational surveillance. Here the operative's goal is to understand/record what the target does outside the home, who he meets with, where he goes. Any details that directly or indirectly confirm the fact of illegal activity, as well as those that can be used for blackmail and persuasion. As a rule, OSD employees are assigned to a specific target and organize their work themselves, depending on the operative's tasks. Usually this is surveillance of movements, covert presence at open public events.
Here, for safety, it is enough to pay attention to details and train observation skills. Watch what cars you meet periodically along the route, and it is more important to notice the distinguishing features of the cars, and not the state number. The office has sets of state numbers, and when conducting surveillance, they are changed regularly without fail. But with material support, everything is not so good, and the cars almost do not change, so it is possible to identify one car.
It is recommended to simply look around during meetings and any business conversations. In pursuit of the goal of documenting the subject of your conversation, the office employees will strive to be as close as possible, which significantly increases the chance of being detected. If you notice a car parked nearby with windows tightened to "zero", then it is better to postpone the conversation. If at the next table one character is finishing his 10th glass of coffee throughout the meeting, you should also take a closer look and at least reduce the volume of the conversation.
In general, approximately such a set of measures to collect evidence will be carried out in relation to the object, and how to protect yourself at one stage or another, the choice is in any case individual.
At a certain point, it is time to sum up the results and justify to the management the need for further work on the object or its termination. It is important to understand that it is bad to terminate a case due to failure to confirm the initial information. Firstly, it casts a shadow on the professionalism of the operative and his superior, and secondly, it spoils the statistics. The operative presents the first report after six months of work and, it happens that during this time he does not have sufficient evidence to implement the materials in criminal proceedings.
There are two solutions here:
Extend the case for another six months (if there is confidence that it will be possible to implement it), or terminate the case.
If events develop according to the second scenario, then a wording convenient for the service is used: "due to the impossibility of carrying out further illegal activity." In practice, this usually involves dismissal of the object, closure of the company, forced bankruptcy, seizure of accounts, etc. That is, any actions carried out under a "false flag" aimed at preventing the object from committing any further crimes.
So the detective gets a normal reason to close the material, and the boss will not look pale when reporting to higher management. And the target will only get minor problems instead of a term, without guessing about their true causes. In general, everything is "in the black".
If events develop according to the first scenario, the detective is engaged in scaling up his activities. That is, if there is no evidence in the actions of the target, he will look for it in the actions of his environment - relatives, friends, colleagues. And all the above-described activities will be carried out in relation to them too. Working with the environment allows the detective to act more openly, surveys are often used, usually under the flag of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, everything is carefully covered with a legend so as not to reveal the source of his interests to the interviewee.
If this does not give a result, then they can be conducted in a more negative light, offering to openly leak the object of the check. At the same time, any information can be used as an argument for persuasion. The so-called "trump card" of the operative is kept up his sleeve until the right moment, and if necessary he can insert: "if you don't want your wife to see the footage of you frolicking with your secretary, tell me what you know." Sometimes the operative can promise career advancement for leaking the information. As a rule, such argumentation gives a good result.
When the detective has collected enough evidence, it is time to go directly to the subject of the investigation and "finish off" it. It is important to understand that the detective is engaged in operational-search activities and conducts operational-search measures, the results of which are not evidence in court. If you are invited to such a conversation and there is something to fear, take a lawyer with you, he must be present the whole time and from this moment on become your best friend.
During the conversation, they will try to get a confession from you under the protocol. The ideal option for the detective is when you sign the protocol under the warning about liability under Articles 306, 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Thus, you will close the trap, from which it will be very difficult to get out.
The key point here is that the detective is conducting your questioning, since until a criminal case is opened against you, you are not a subject of criminal proceedings and cannot be held liable under Articles 306, 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
In general, this meeting will be decisive for the further development of events - if the detective gets his way, he will transfer the materials either to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or to his investigation, which will then open a case and subsequently all the collected data will be transferred to the category of evidence, and an investigator will come to meet you, who will ask the same questions that were asked earlier, but for the interrogation protocol.
This is where two divisions of the service come into play - the OTD (operational technical department) and the OSD (operational search department). The capabilities of each division are limited and clearly divided, so if it is necessary to avoid attention, you can always find ways around it.
When an employee needs to obtain information on an object engaged in illegal activity, everything is taken into account.
In addition to the dirty laundry, any information about a potential criminal that can be used in one way or another to achieve their goals is of interest.
Cheating, buying illegal goods, forging documents, tax evasion, even traffic violations. All the information that the operative can accumulate on a person, he begins to scrupulously accumulate, initially collecting from official sources with requests, checking databases and archives, making inquiries, scouring social networks and the vastness of the Runet, connecting connections and acquaintances who can provide characteristics and any other information.
The activities carried out by these departments already violate the constitutional rights of citizens and require a court sanction to carry them out. But let's not forget that we are talking about our country, and such sanctions, as a rule, are formal in nature, unless, of course, we are talking about work on Gref and other figures and oligarchs.In such cases, the judge will cover his ass to the last and will require the operative to provide a mandatory full justification for the need for such activities, with arguments and evidence that the object is involved in illegal activities. If we are talking about ordinary citizens or businessmen, the justification is written formally.
It is possible that left-wing names will be added to the list of real objects, if the operative needs, for example, to wiretap someone of his own or needs to resolve certain personal issues. Often, such sanctions are issued "retroactively", when in fact wiretapping and a set of measures have already been carried out. Here again, it is extremely important to have a strong lawyer who knows such principles of work and can prove that the sanction was received retroactively.When the court's sanction is received, the OSD starts implementing a set of measures. First of all, this is wiretapping and reading SMS. Here the possibilities are wide and the methods have long been technically developed.
Knowing the subscriber's number, it is not a problem to calculate the IMEI of the handset from which calls are made, and knowing this data, the office will already see all the SIM cards entering the handset. In addition, there is a set of measures aimed at calculating other numbers connecting to the network simultaneously with the base number. This is how the object's left SIM cards are calculated if he uses another handset for business.
The calculation is carried out by cross-analysis of the volume of numbers simultaneously displayed in the sought cells. As soon as the operative sees periodically repeated coincidences in the appearance in the cell with the base number of the same number, he puts it on wiretapping too, and asks the operator for the numbers of base stations to compare them with the movements of the main number. On average, such an event takes 3-4 days.
In addition to remote wiretapping, the office needs to monitor the entire flow of traffic used, which is done through the service provider, so that the operative can see on a daily basis what sites the subject visits, how much time he spends on them and whether he is trying to cover his tracks on the network.
Russian Post is rarely used now, but, nevertheless, the operative will maintain full control of all shipments/receipts through any courier services and mail in your name. And despite the sealing of the parcel in the Russian Post office in your presence, in marked tape and your personal packaging, the parcel will be opened and packed identically to the original packaging, if necessary, again by colleagues from the OSD trained for this.
When the operative understands that the remote channels of control of the object do not provide a sufficient evidence base, then he needs full access to the phone.
Here it is necessary to involve the administrative resource and, as a rule, the work goes according to one of two scenarios:
Openly, when the operative invites the object to the office to clarify some issues, possibly unrelated to the case, but falling within his area of competence.
The second scenario is “under a false flag”, when a similar invitation is made to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Tax Service, Federal Bailiff Service, Pension Fund or any government agency as, for example, a witness, but where an access control system is organized. The purpose of such a visit is one - the object, upon entering the building, must leave the phone in a storage cell, the key to which will allegedly be only with him.
Then, according to the well-worn scenario - while the operative distracts the object, the OSD employees will copy the information from the phone and set up a remote access system to synchronize all actions. The ideal option in this case is if the object came to the meeting with a laptop, notebook, notepad. All of the above is similarly studied, photographed and copied.
Here the advice is simple - you need to enter the building either with a left-hand phone, or leave it before entering the building, and not in the car that you left in the parking lot near the office building.
And immediately indicate that you do not have much time. The above-described activities take about an hour, depending on the volume of copied information, so it is worth paying attention to the behavior of the operative. If he tries to drag out time, while periodically distracted by the phone, which is used to coordinate the activities of colleagues with the OSD, you should leave their conversations.
By the way, Apple's statements about invulnerability are useful for marketing, but not for the special services. Without going into the intricacies of the technical process of gaining access, I can say that bypassing fingerprint protection takes 30 minutes with specialized software. But still, it provides some protection. Firstly, because it drags out time, secondly, because not all departments have special software for Apples. In particular, this concerns the regions, and there the issue of gaining access to apples is more acute, which often comes down to inviting colleagues from Moscow, and this will depend entirely on the importance of the object. That is, for the sake of a fraud of 5-10 million, Moscow will not hire a group.
Next comes the penetration into the home. Access to a laptop or PC can be obtained by understanding the daily routine of the target and knowing when and how long he will be away from home. The ideal option if you are staying in a hotel. The questions are worked out at the proper level and it is not difficult to enter the room to conduct a full examination, check all the records, personal belongings, copy information from the laptop, and also set up an audio-video recording. As a rule, a regular plasma TV is used for this, which is replaced with ours, stuffed with technology instead of the standard one, in advance of your check-in. And in hotels, it is extremely difficult to detect recording devices.
Things are a little more complicated with personal property. Here, master keys and hacking specialists come to the rescue, which a normal operative should always have and, as a rule, colleagues from the Federal Penitentiary Service help select such people. It is possible to penetrate the apartment through the balconies of neighbors; sometimes the practice of attracting individual industrial climbers is used. There are many difficulties here and it is quite possible to secure your home - it is enough to install good doors with modern locks, preferably not factory ones, but expensive, non-standard ones, and always close all available doors and windows when leaving.
It is also useful to maintain friendly relations with neighbors so that if anything happens, they can warn you about any visits and inquiries about you.
Penetration activities are planned several weeks in advance, sometimes a month in advance, and are meticulously worked out taking into account a huge number of factors, so maneuvers to ensure security are quite possible. The level of significance should also be taken into account. If you are engaged in espionage, financing "bearded ones", or have established a regular supply channel for illegal drugs, there will be ways to get into the apartment. If the activity does not promise the operative a sharp promotion or an extraordinary rank, it will be enough for him to remotely remove information about you with the involvement of colleagues from the OSD in the development.
OSD employees are engaged in operational surveillance. Here the operative's goal is to understand/record what the target does outside the home, who he meets with, where he goes. Any details that directly or indirectly confirm the fact of illegal activity, as well as those that can be used for blackmail and persuasion. As a rule, OSD employees are assigned to a specific target and organize their work themselves, depending on the operative's tasks. Usually this is surveillance of movements, covert presence at open public events.
Here, for safety, it is enough to pay attention to details and train observation skills. Watch what cars you meet periodically along the route, and it is more important to notice the distinguishing features of the cars, and not the state number. The office has sets of state numbers, and when conducting surveillance, they are changed regularly without fail. But with material support, everything is not so good, and the cars almost do not change, so it is possible to identify one car.
It is recommended to simply look around during meetings and any business conversations. In pursuit of the goal of documenting the subject of your conversation, the office employees will strive to be as close as possible, which significantly increases the chance of being detected. If you notice a car parked nearby with windows tightened to "zero", then it is better to postpone the conversation. If at the next table one character is finishing his 10th glass of coffee throughout the meeting, you should also take a closer look and at least reduce the volume of the conversation.
In general, approximately such a set of measures to collect evidence will be carried out in relation to the object, and how to protect yourself at one stage or another, the choice is in any case individual.
At a certain point, it is time to sum up the results and justify to the management the need for further work on the object or its termination. It is important to understand that it is bad to terminate a case due to failure to confirm the initial information. Firstly, it casts a shadow on the professionalism of the operative and his superior, and secondly, it spoils the statistics. The operative presents the first report after six months of work and, it happens that during this time he does not have sufficient evidence to implement the materials in criminal proceedings.
There are two solutions here:
Extend the case for another six months (if there is confidence that it will be possible to implement it), or terminate the case. If events develop according to the second scenario, then a wording convenient for the service is used: "due to the impossibility of carrying out further illegal activity." In practice, this usually involves dismissal of the object, closure of the company, forced bankruptcy, seizure of accounts, etc. That is, any actions carried out under a "false flag" aimed at preventing the object from committing any further crimes.So the detective gets a normal reason to close the material, and the boss will not look pale when reporting to higher management. And the target will only get minor problems instead of a term, without guessing about their true causes. In general, everything is "in the black".
If events develop according to the first scenario, the detective is engaged in scaling up his activities. That is, if there is no evidence in the actions of the target, he will look for it in the actions of his environment - relatives, friends, colleagues. And all the above-described activities will be carried out in relation to them too. Working with the environment allows the detective to act more openly, surveys are often used, usually under the flag of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, everything is carefully covered with a legend so as not to reveal the source of his interests to the interviewee.
If this does not give a result, then they can be conducted in a more negative light, offering to openly leak the object of the check. At the same time, any information can be used as an argument for persuasion. The so-called "trump card" of the operative is kept up his sleeve until the right moment, and if necessary he can insert: "if you don't want your wife to see the footage of you frolicking with your secretary, tell me what you know." Sometimes the operative can promise career advancement for leaking the information. As a rule, such argumentation gives a good result.
When the detective has collected enough evidence, it is time to go directly to the subject of the investigation and "finish off" it. It is important to understand that the detective is engaged in operational-search activities and conducts operational-search measures, the results of which are not evidence in court. If you are invited to such a conversation and there is something to fear, take a lawyer with you, he must be present the whole time and from this moment on become your best friend.
During the conversation, they will try to get a confession from you under the protocol. The ideal option for the detective is when you sign the protocol under the warning about liability under Articles 306, 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Thus, you will close the trap, from which it will be very difficult to get out.
The key point here is that the detective is conducting your questioning, since until a criminal case is opened against you, you are not a subject of criminal proceedings and cannot be held liable under Articles 306, 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
In general, this meeting will be decisive for the further development of events - if the detective gets his way, he will transfer the materials either to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or to his investigation, which will then open a case and subsequently all the collected data will be transferred to the category of evidence, and an investigator will come to meet you, who will ask the same questions that were asked earlier, but for the interrogation protocol.
