Hello! How is the left sim calculated? You won't believe it: on your real phone. In this article, I will look at such terms as "signals in the network", "cells", "recursive sampling" and other wonders of law enforcement.
The description uses the term "activation" — this is the moment when the "anonymous" device went online. So, let's go, let's look at different situations.
Situation one: You use an "anonymous" mobile phone, but the real one is nearby and turned on. Investigators request logs of the entire cell in which the "anonymous" device works (worked). That's all they need to figure you out. They make recursive samples based on the power-on intervals and see who else was in the cell except for the "anonymous" device. For example, in one cell there were 1000 more phones turned on. The next time you turn on 500 of those that were the first time. At the next stage-20 of those who were in the first and second time.
Most often, it is possible to find exactly a couple of phones that do not leave the cell from the logs of three or four inclusions. Less often, more inclusions are required: in this case, you can try to break through the history by the numbers of multiple matches, as well as their owners. If this is a grandmother of 90 years, of which she has had the number for 10 years and she has not left the apartment for 5 years-then, obviously, the option disappears.
Thus, investigators quickly get to the real phone number, one call history on which will reveal all the cards. Often, special services are lucky even with the 2nd inclusion: quickly study and sweep away hundreds of numbers — it's just a matter of the number of employees. It even happens that the real number is accessed from the first and only activation of "anonymous"! Don't believe me? But in vain.
The dynamics in the cell, the behavior of other devices, and weekdays / holidays can significantly simplify the work of security forces. During the operation of the "anonymous" mobile phone, everyone else can get out of the cell, except for your phone (well, other people took it and moved somewhere) or make outgoing calls, send SMS.
Now is the time when everything is not a minute without a mobile phone. And that's what's bugging you: you can't make outgoing calls from two phones at the same time. So while you are "working" with "anonymous", everyone who calls in your cell gets out of suspicion and narrows the ring around you. In addition, the case is not on your side: the special services have logs with all the data from and to, and you have a normal life with all the unpredictability.
Example: You surf "anonymously" on the Internet and then you get a call on a real phone. You start talking and data traffic on the Internet drops by a time statistically different from the time between average page loads. Match all calls in the cell for an exact match with the traffic failure-just a matter of seconds — and your number is detected. It may be, of course, that you just went to the toilet, but it is not difficult to check whether the desired number is "detected". What if they call you twice?
The criminal turned on the phone, sent a text message demanding a ransom, and turned it off. A day later, I turned it on, called to discuss the terms of the buyout, and turned it off. I turned it on for the third time, gave you the meeting place and time, and turned it off. We studied the logs for three "inclusions" — who was in the cell all three times at that moment. From the second "reconciliation" there are four numbers left, from the third — one.
Situation two: You use an "anonymous" mobile phone, but you carefully turn off the real one in advance. Incredibly, you've only made it easier for the investigators. They will simply see who is disconnected - it is disconnected (the phone sends a signal about disconnection to the network), and did not leave the network shortly before the appearance of "anonymous". We can safely say that there will be only a few of them in the cell, or even you alone. To clarify the data, you can compare who turned on after disabling "anonymous". And, just, punch on the grannies and others. As you can see, disabling this device when using the "left" only worsens anonymity.
Situation three: You leave the real phone at home turned on, and you go to another cell, and only there turn on "anonymous". Think it's a clever plan? But nifiga. Three factors still give away your real device.
First, the same scheme is being worked out as in the first situation, only not for one cell, but for several. First one at a time, then the next ones, and so on until they come to comparing the cell of the "anonymous" with the cell of the real one.
Secondly and most importantly, your device is at home without an owner and cannot answer calls. Therefore, sooner or later there will be missing ones, which are also visible in the logs. You just need to compare which device was missed at all times "inclusion" of anonymous.
Do you think many of your callers don't pick up the phone all the time when you leave anonymous? No one but your real phone! In addition, this method is very useful in general search: investigators can very quickly call the numbers that remain after comparing the cell logs. And if the phone is not taken — in the suspects.
Third, you can't leave a real phone anywhere — in different places every time. It's probably at your home. That is, in one place for each activation. On this basis, you can build an additional sample for the filter: how many of the same devices were in the same cell. In general, all this will lead to a quick, albeit slightly less fast, exit to the real number than in previous cases.
Situation four: You turn off the real phone at home, and you go to another cell, and only there turn on "anonymous". See situation # 3 + situation # 2
It turns out that the whole scheme works on the fact that several inclusions are made from one number. That is, if you leave the number only once and then throw out the SIM card and phone — it will be impossible to find it?
This will only help if the "case" is yours for one time and there were no other similar cases and will not be any more. That is, the reality of all real "cases" - will not help.
Changing phone numbers doesn't make it any harder to find a real phone number. For example, in the same example about blackmail: how to change the number will help — after all, the victim is the same calls are made. Investigators will simply break through not one number of 3 inclusions, but three inclusions of different numbers. Similarly, "dark deeds" on the Internet — numbers are easily combined in a common "case".
Let's say more-frequent number changes only worsen security because investigators will get groups of numbers and will be able to easily break through, for example, where the SIM cards come from. And cover you red-handed during the purchase of new ones or go to the "seller" who will make a "robot" or merge the number from which you called him.
Anonymity is not a lack of identification data. This simply cannot happen in the modern world. Anonymity is a good imitation of an ordinary, but not a real person.
The description uses the term "activation" — this is the moment when the "anonymous" device went online. So, let's go, let's look at different situations.
Situation one: You use an "anonymous" mobile phone, but the real one is nearby and turned on. Investigators request logs of the entire cell in which the "anonymous" device works (worked). That's all they need to figure you out. They make recursive samples based on the power-on intervals and see who else was in the cell except for the "anonymous" device. For example, in one cell there were 1000 more phones turned on. The next time you turn on 500 of those that were the first time. At the next stage-20 of those who were in the first and second time.
Most often, it is possible to find exactly a couple of phones that do not leave the cell from the logs of three or four inclusions. Less often, more inclusions are required: in this case, you can try to break through the history by the numbers of multiple matches, as well as their owners. If this is a grandmother of 90 years, of which she has had the number for 10 years and she has not left the apartment for 5 years-then, obviously, the option disappears.
Thus, investigators quickly get to the real phone number, one call history on which will reveal all the cards. Often, special services are lucky even with the 2nd inclusion: quickly study and sweep away hundreds of numbers — it's just a matter of the number of employees. It even happens that the real number is accessed from the first and only activation of "anonymous"! Don't believe me? But in vain.
The dynamics in the cell, the behavior of other devices, and weekdays / holidays can significantly simplify the work of security forces. During the operation of the "anonymous" mobile phone, everyone else can get out of the cell, except for your phone (well, other people took it and moved somewhere) or make outgoing calls, send SMS.
Now is the time when everything is not a minute without a mobile phone. And that's what's bugging you: you can't make outgoing calls from two phones at the same time. So while you are "working" with "anonymous", everyone who calls in your cell gets out of suspicion and narrows the ring around you. In addition, the case is not on your side: the special services have logs with all the data from and to, and you have a normal life with all the unpredictability.
Example: You surf "anonymously" on the Internet and then you get a call on a real phone. You start talking and data traffic on the Internet drops by a time statistically different from the time between average page loads. Match all calls in the cell for an exact match with the traffic failure-just a matter of seconds — and your number is detected. It may be, of course, that you just went to the toilet, but it is not difficult to check whether the desired number is "detected". What if they call you twice?
The criminal turned on the phone, sent a text message demanding a ransom, and turned it off. A day later, I turned it on, called to discuss the terms of the buyout, and turned it off. I turned it on for the third time, gave you the meeting place and time, and turned it off. We studied the logs for three "inclusions" — who was in the cell all three times at that moment. From the second "reconciliation" there are four numbers left, from the third — one.
Situation two: You use an "anonymous" mobile phone, but you carefully turn off the real one in advance. Incredibly, you've only made it easier for the investigators. They will simply see who is disconnected - it is disconnected (the phone sends a signal about disconnection to the network), and did not leave the network shortly before the appearance of "anonymous". We can safely say that there will be only a few of them in the cell, or even you alone. To clarify the data, you can compare who turned on after disabling "anonymous". And, just, punch on the grannies and others. As you can see, disabling this device when using the "left" only worsens anonymity.
Situation three: You leave the real phone at home turned on, and you go to another cell, and only there turn on "anonymous". Think it's a clever plan? But nifiga. Three factors still give away your real device.
First, the same scheme is being worked out as in the first situation, only not for one cell, but for several. First one at a time, then the next ones, and so on until they come to comparing the cell of the "anonymous" with the cell of the real one.
Secondly and most importantly, your device is at home without an owner and cannot answer calls. Therefore, sooner or later there will be missing ones, which are also visible in the logs. You just need to compare which device was missed at all times "inclusion" of anonymous.
Do you think many of your callers don't pick up the phone all the time when you leave anonymous? No one but your real phone! In addition, this method is very useful in general search: investigators can very quickly call the numbers that remain after comparing the cell logs. And if the phone is not taken — in the suspects.
Third, you can't leave a real phone anywhere — in different places every time. It's probably at your home. That is, in one place for each activation. On this basis, you can build an additional sample for the filter: how many of the same devices were in the same cell. In general, all this will lead to a quick, albeit slightly less fast, exit to the real number than in previous cases.
Situation four: You turn off the real phone at home, and you go to another cell, and only there turn on "anonymous". See situation # 3 + situation # 2
It turns out that the whole scheme works on the fact that several inclusions are made from one number. That is, if you leave the number only once and then throw out the SIM card and phone — it will be impossible to find it?
This will only help if the "case" is yours for one time and there were no other similar cases and will not be any more. That is, the reality of all real "cases" - will not help.
Changing phone numbers doesn't make it any harder to find a real phone number. For example, in the same example about blackmail: how to change the number will help — after all, the victim is the same calls are made. Investigators will simply break through not one number of 3 inclusions, but three inclusions of different numbers. Similarly, "dark deeds" on the Internet — numbers are easily combined in a common "case".
Let's say more-frequent number changes only worsen security because investigators will get groups of numbers and will be able to easily break through, for example, where the SIM cards come from. And cover you red-handed during the purchase of new ones or go to the "seller" who will make a "robot" or merge the number from which you called him.
Anonymity is not a lack of identification data. This simply cannot happen in the modern world. Anonymity is a good imitation of an ordinary, but not a real person.
