The new technology makes it possible to track movements in nuclear storage facilities.
An international group of information security experts led by the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP) and the Ruhr University Bochum has developed a methodology for using radio signals to verify the location of nuclear arsenals. This discovery may become a key step in monitoring compliance with international agreements on nuclear weapons.
The crux of the problem is that arms limitation treaties require trust between countries, which is not always present. Verification without trust becomes a difficult task, especially when physical inspection is prohibited and there is a risk of deception or substitution of warheads.
The new system uses antennas installed in a room with nuclear warheads. One antenna transmits the signal that bounces off the walls, while the other receives and records it. The radio signature obtained in this way is unique: any change in the location of objects in the room will change the signature.
To prevent signature forgery, the researchers implemented a system with rotating mirrors that create 10 возможных possible configurations of radio wave reflection. This makes it almost impossible to fake without knowing exactly when the original signature was created, and also requires significant time to calculate the fake.
Professor Christian Zenger, head of the Mobile Security Research Group at Ruhr University and CEO of PHYSEC GmbH, noted that the technology combines cyber-physical security assessments previously applied only to data and chip security with cross-system physics, opening up new levels of trust, especially for the Internet of Things.
The study was published in the journal Nature Communications.
An international group of information security experts led by the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP) and the Ruhr University Bochum has developed a methodology for using radio signals to verify the location of nuclear arsenals. This discovery may become a key step in monitoring compliance with international agreements on nuclear weapons.
The crux of the problem is that arms limitation treaties require trust between countries, which is not always present. Verification without trust becomes a difficult task, especially when physical inspection is prohibited and there is a risk of deception or substitution of warheads.
The new system uses antennas installed in a room with nuclear warheads. One antenna transmits the signal that bounces off the walls, while the other receives and records it. The radio signature obtained in this way is unique: any change in the location of objects in the room will change the signature.
To prevent signature forgery, the researchers implemented a system with rotating mirrors that create 10 возможных possible configurations of radio wave reflection. This makes it almost impossible to fake without knowing exactly when the original signature was created, and also requires significant time to calculate the fake.
Professor Christian Zenger, head of the Mobile Security Research Group at Ruhr University and CEO of PHYSEC GmbH, noted that the technology combines cyber-physical security assessments previously applied only to data and chip security with cross-system physics, opening up new levels of trust, especially for the Internet of Things.
The study was published in the journal Nature Communications.
